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DELEGATED DECREE AUTHORITY IN
CONTEMPORARY SOUTH AMERICA:
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE
RADICAL LEFT AND THEIR THREAT
TO THE RULE OF LAW
Kerry Mohan*
ABSTRACT
Internationalattention regardingexecutive decree authority within Latin
America has significantly increased following Hugo Chdvez' 2007 Enabling Law in Venezuela. This attention has largely been negative, as the
international media has often vilified Chdvez for promulgating decrees
with the force of law. What the internationalmedia has continually failed
to discuss, however, is that Chdvez' form of decree authority, "delegated
decree authority" (DDA), has been common throughout Venezuela's history, as well as that of most of South America. This article seeks to determine DDA's prevalence within South America, in particular within
Venezuela and Ecuador, and determine whether DDA poses a threat to the
rule of law within these nations. By focusing on Hugo Chdvez of Venezuela and Rafael Correaof Ecuador, we have a unique opportunity to see
whether these charismatic leaders have used DDA to increase their lawmaking authority and consolidate powers within the Executive branch.

SINCE

I.

INTRODUCTION

2000, Hugo ChAvez has captured international attention

through his continued desire to enact broad, sweeping decrees with
the force of law under Venezuela's "Enabling Law."' This media
attention increased to new heights in August 2008, after ChAvez promulgated twenty-six decrees in a single day-the last day of the eighteenmonth enabling law-causing the international media to label ChAvez as
a socialist, a dictator, and an authoritarian. 2
Graduate of University of Wisconsin Law School with dual degrees in Law
and Latin American, Caribbean, and Iberian Studies. Thanks to Professors Alexandra Huneeus, Christina Ewig, Alberto Vargas, and Allison Christians for their
helpful comments and suggestions.
1. Stephen Lendman, Corporate Media Bashes New Chdvez Enabling Law Decrees,
ArrANTIc FREE PREsS, Aug. 18, 2008, http://www.atlanticfreepress.com/news/1/
4840-corporate-media-bashes-new-chavez-enabling-law-decrees-.html.
2. Id.
*2010
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What the international media has continuously failed to report, however, is that Chdvez' form of decree authority, "delegated decree authority" (DDA), has been common throughout Venezuela's history and most
of South America.3 In fact, eight constitutions in South America specifically provide their Executives lawmaking authority through DDA. 4 Thus,
while it may be fair to criticize ChAvez for some of his actions,5 it may not
be fair to criticize him for using DDA, considering its relatively frequent
use both by his predecessors in Venezuela and by other Latin American
leaders.
This article seeks to determine the prevalence of DDA within South
America and whether DDA presents a threat to the rule of law. In particular, this article focuses on DDA in Venezuela under Hugo ChAvez and
Ecuador under Rafael Correa. The focus on Venezuela is a result of the
amount of media attention given to ChAvez' enabling laws and his decree
authority.6 Additionally, the focus on Ecuador is due to the fact that Ecuador presents a different form of DDA than Venezuela-post-approval
DDA-that will help enrich our overall understanding of DDA. Furthermore, Ecuador's current president, Rafael Correa, is a leader who has
often been placed in the same "radical left" category as ChAvez. 7 While
this categorization may be appropriate due to Correa's leftist political
ideology, this article seeks to determine whether Correa has acted similarly to Chivez regarding the use of DDA.
Moreover, I selected ChAvez and Correa because I consider them to be
the most charismatic and popular leaders in their nations' modern histories-for instance, each has been elected multiple times, an unusual occurrence in both of their nations' recent histories.8 Both leaders have
also succeeded in re-writing their respective nations' constitutions to pro3. Delegated decree authority may also have a more specific name depending on the
country, i.e., the decretazo in Argentina or the "enabling law" in Venezuela. See
John M. Carey & Matthew S. Shugart, Appendix of ConstitutionalProvisions Regarding Decree, in EXECUTIVE DECREE AUTHORITY app. at 299 (John M. Carey &

Matthew S. Shugart eds., 1998); Brian F. Crisp, PresidentialDecree Authority in
Venezuela, in ExEcurivE DECREE AUTHORITY 142, 145-46 (John M. Carey &

Matthew S. Shugart eds., 1998); Delia F. Rubio & Matteo Goretti, When the President Governs Alone: The Decretazo in Argentina, 1989-93, in EXECUTIVE DECREE

Aurnioirry 33, 33 (John M. Carey & Matthew S. Shugart eds., 1998).
4. Counting only the Latin American nations within South America, this is eight out
of ten nations. Carey & Shugart, supra note 3, at 299; John M. Carey & Matthew
S. Shugart, Calling Out the Tanks or Filling Out the Forms?, in ExEcuiiVE DEclREE AUTHORrrY 10 (John M. Carey & Matthew S. Shugart eds., 1998).

5. Those actions may include imprisoning opposition leaders or attacking media outlets. See Roger F. Noriega, Venezuela Under Chavez: The Path toward Dictatorship, Nov. 3, 2006, http://www.aei.org/docLib/20060606_LAOJuneg.pdf.
6. See Lendman, supra note 1.

7. Francisco Panizza & Romina Miorelli, Populism and Democracy in Latin America,
23 E--ucs & INT'L AwFAIRs 39, 39 (2009), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.

com/doi/10.111 1/j.1747-7093.2009.00188.x/pdf.
8. Gene Healy, South of the Border, the Cult of the Presidency, DC EXAMINER, Feb.
2, 2010, available at http://www.cato.org/pub-display.php?pub-id=11188; Ecuador's CorreaAims for "Citizens' Revolution" in Second Term, XINIIUANEws, Aug.
11, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-08/11/content_11863725.htm
[hereinafter Ecuador's Correa].
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vide for consecutive or longer presidential terms with greater Executive
powers. 9 Accordingly, these leaders possess substantial political capital
that can be used to obtain powerful forms of DDA.' 0 Thus, the current
political landscape within Venezuela and Ecuador provides a unique opportunity to analyze DDA and determine whether these leaders have
used DDA to increase their lawmaking authority and consolidate power
within the Executive branch.
This article is divided into six sections. After this introduction, Section
II provides definitions of Latin American democracy and the rule of law.
Because the rule of law is a contested concept, the Section's goal is to
provide a generalized definition of the rule of law to create the framework for the subsequent analysis regarding whether Chivez and Correa's
DDA use poses a threat to the rule of law.
Next, Section III focuses on delegated decree authority by first defining
DDA, then by providing an analysis of what DDA is and, perhaps more
importantly, what DDA is not. Section III also discusses critiques of the
current state of academic literature concerning DDA. Finally, the Section addresses the theoretical threat DDA poses to the rule of law.
Section IV provides a textual analysis of the constitutional grants of
DDA within Venezuela and Ecuador. By examining the language of Venezuela and Ecuador's old and new constitutions, Section IV determines
just how DDA powers have changed through new constitutions drafted
under the tutelage of Chdvez and Correa.
Section V analyzes how DDA has been used in practice in Venezuela
and Ecuador. For each country, Section V analyzes how DDA has been
used before and under these leaders. Accordingly, Section V seeks to
determine whether these leaders' use of DDA has been an unprecedented grab of lawmaking power by the Executive, or if these leaders are
exercising the same scope of decree authority as their predecessors.
Finally, Section VI analyzes whether Chivez or Correa's use of DDA
poses a threat to the rule of law. As such, Section VI applies the principles adopted in Section II to the facts found in Section V. Section VI will
finish with a prescription of what limits must be placed on DDA in South
America to protect the rule of law.
DEMOCRATIC RULE OF LAW
Contemporary democracy "is distinctive in being based on the rule of
law."" Accordingly, it can be argued that democracy fails without the
rule of law. But before we can begin an analysis over what the rule of law
means, it is necessary to define what democracy means in Latin America.
Democracy in Latin America requires: "(1) contestation over policy and
political competition for office; (2) participation of the citizenry through
partisan, associational, and other forms of collective action; (3) accountaII.

9. Healy, supra note 8.
10. Healy, supra note 8; Ecuador's Correa, supra note 8.
11. THE RULE OF LAw 2 (Ian Shapiro, ed., 1994); see Lendman, supra note 1.
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bility of rulers to the ruled through mechanisms of representation and the
rule of law; and (4) civilian control over the military."1 2 Although DDA
can have negative effects on many of these requirements, this article focuses solely on how DDA affects the rule of law in Latin American
democracies.
Although the rule of law is universally recognized, it is a "notoriously
contested concept."' 3 As such, this article does not seek to challenge the
current understanding of the rule of law throughout Latin America. Instead, this paper simply seeks to use the generalized concept of the rule
of law as a measuring-stick for determining DDA's threat in Venezuela
and Ecuador.
Despite being a contested concept, the rule of law is universally defined to require that "law matters and should matter."'14 For laws to matter, they should be "general, public, prospective, clear, consistent, capable
of being followed, stable, impartially applied, and enforced."' 5 The rule
of law also requires that all actors within society, including the Executive,
"be subject to limitation by law." 16 This requirement exists because the
democratic rule of law works only when "horizontal accountability function[s] effectively, without obstruction and intimidation from powerful
state actors." 17 In the context of DDA, such horizontal accountability
prevents the consolidation of lawmaking power within the Executive
branch.' 8
One key aspect of the rule of law in relation to DDA is the argument
that the rule of law demands that all political actors, regardless of their
political orientation, have a "voice" and are able to participate in the creation of legislation. 19 Such "formal equality" in the legislative process
requires that legislation be sanctioned following "previously and carefully
dictated procedures." 20 Without the use of carefully dictated procedures,
politically powerful voices can silence weaker ones, effectively excluding
12. Terry Lynn Karl, Dilemmas of Democratizationin Latin America, 23 CoMr. Po.. 1,
2 (1990). Karl's definition of democracy is used because it is particularly relevant
to Latin America and its long history of military governments.
13. John C. Reitz, Symposium: Export of the Rule of Law, 13 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 429, 435 (2003) (quoting Martin Krygier, Marxism and the Rule of
law: Reflections After the Collapse of Communism, 15 LAw & Soc. INQuIRY 633,
640 (1990)); Randall Peerenboom, Human Rights and Rule of Law: What's the
Relationship?, 36 GiEo. J. INT'L L. 809, 826 (2005).
14. Reitz, supra note 13, at 436.
15. Id. at 440.
16. Id. at 435; Guillermo O'Donnell, Why the Rule of Law Matters, 15 J. on DEMOCRAcy

32, 34 (2004).

17. O'Donnell, supra note 16, at 37; Guillermo O'Donnell, Polyarchies and the
IN
(Un)Rule of law, in THE (UN)RuLe O1 LAW AND THE UNDERPRIVILEGE)
LAnN AMERICA 303, 303 (Juan E. Mendez et. al eds., 1999).
18. Christopher J. Walker, Toward Democratic Consolidation? The Argentine Supreme
Court, Judicial Independence, and the Rule of law, 18 FLA. J. INT'L L. 745, 760 n.3
(2006).
19. Id. at 757.
20. O'Donnell, supra note 16, at 32; see generally Walker, supra note 18, at 757.
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portions of society from contributing to legislative content. 21 Such exclusion, in turn, can result in sections of society removing themselves from
the political process because they no longer believe that their interests
are being represented. 22 Over time, without formal equality, political
competition turns into a one-party game where the politically powerful
actors are able to skew the rules of the game to permanently hinder political participation from opposing voices.
III.

DELEGATED DECREE AUTHORITY
A.

WHAT

is DDA?

Delegated decree authority (DDA) is a constitutionally-provided
power permitting the Legislature to grant the Executive the authority to
change the nation's status quo by promulgating decrees with the force of
law. 2 3 DDA exists in two forms: (1) pre-approval DDA and (2) postapproval DDA. 2 4 The two differ in that while one form requires legislative approval prior to the decrees ("pre-approval DDA"), the other requires legislative action after the decree ("post-approval DDA"). 2 5 In
both forms of DDA, the key component is the Executive-Legislative interplay, whereby the Legislature effectively grants the Executive the right
to enact decrees with the force of law. 2 6 In pre-approval DDA, this Executive-Legislative interplay occurs before the Executive has DDA powers,
with the Legislature granting DDA powers in a piece of legislation containing the scope and time-length of the DDA grant. 2 7 In post-approval
DDA, the Executive-Legislative interplay occurs after the Executive
sends his decree to the Legislature, whereby the Legislature has a specific
amount of time-i.e., thirty days-to approve, modify, reject, or acquiesce to the Executive's decree. 28
The substantive scope and time length of both forms of DDA are limited by a nation's constitution and the Legislature. 29 For instance, while a
constitution may provide a broad scope of DDA powers, the Legislature
can limit the scope to specific areas of law. 30
Because Executive decrees under DDA have the force of law, those
decrees become the new status quo for the nation.3 ' As such, decrees
passed under DDA nullify prior laws of the same subject matter and es21. See generally O'Donnell, supra note 16, at 32; see generally Walker, supra note 18,
at 757.
22. See generally Walker, supra note 18, at 757.
23. Carey & Shugart, supra note 4, at 13.
24. Id. at 10.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Scott Mainwaring & Matthew S. Shugart, Presidentialismand Democracy in Latin
America: Rethinking the Terms of the Debate, in PRESIDENTIALISM & DEMOCRACY
IN LATIN AMERICA 12, 44 (Scott Mainwaring & Matthew S. Shugart eds., 1997).
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tablish new rights or obligations. 32 Moreover, because decrees enacted
under DDA have the force of law, they can only be repealed or altered by
subsequent legislation or a Supreme Court decision.33
Both pre-approval and post-approval DDA are prevalent throughout
South America (see Figure 1). Although prevalent, it is important to
note that each country maintains its own unique system of DDA. As
such, the amount of relative freedom the Executive has in issuing decrees
under DDA differs substantially throughout the region. 34 Nonetheless,
the key aspect common through all of these countries' forms of DDA is
the Executive-Legislative interplay.
Figure 1: Constitutionally-Established DDA in South America
Type of DDA

Length of DDA

Scope

Other Limitations

Both

No limit

Pre-Approval:
Administration
and Public
Emergency

None

Post-Approval

Legislature has
30 days to act

No limit

None

Both

1 year

No limit

Post-approval
decrees must be
used to prevent
serious detriment
to the country

Pre-Approval

6 months

Economic and
Financial

None

Ecuador"

Post-Approval

Legislature has
30 days to act

Economically
Urgent

1 DDA decree at
a time

Peru 4 0

Both

No limit

No limit

None

Post-Approval

Legislature has
45 days to act

No limit

I DDA decree at
a time

Pre-Approval

No limit

No Limit

None

Argentina 3

5

36

Brazil

Chile3

7

Colombia

Uruguay

38

41

Venezuela

42

32. Id.
33. Id. at 45.
34. For instance, while post-approval DDA in Ecuador provides the Legislature thirty
days to respond to the president's decree, Uruguay's post-approval DDA provides
its Legislature forty-five days to respond. See Mainwaring & Shugart, supra note
31, at 44.
35. Carey & Shugart, supra note 3, at 299.

36. Gary Reich, Executive Decree Authority in Brazil: How Reactive Legislators
Influence Policy, 27 LEGIs. Sorui). Q. 5, 10 n.1 (2002).

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Scorr MORGENSTERN

&

BENErO

NACIF,

LEGISL.ATIVE

POLITICS

IN

LATIN

AMERICA 101 (2002).
Mainwaring & Shugart, supra note 31, at 45, 47; Carey & Shugart, supra note 4, at
11.
Mainwaring & Shugart, supra note 31, at 45.
Id.
Id. at 46.
Crisp, supra note 3, at 146; Carey & Shugart, supra note 3, at 307.
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The purposes behind pre-approval and post-approval DDA differ dramatically. Pre-approval DDA is often used during times of political, social, or economic change. 43 For instance, pre-approval DDA allows a
leader to dramatically change a country's political institutions to increase
popular involvement, restructure state resources, and even change the
country's political ideology. 4 4 Moreover, by granting pre-approval DDA,
a Legislature can avoid political bickering and allow more change to occur than would likely happen under the traditional lawmaking process. 4 5
Post-approval DDA, on the other hand, is not as useful in creating
wide-spread change. Rather, Executives often use post-approval DDA to
force a deadlocked Legislature to address pressing issues that may be politically unpopular. 46 Because the Legislature has a limited time to respond to a proposed decree, it often must shift its focus from other issues
to the Executive's decree to ensure a proper discussion of the subject. 47
DDA is arguably beneficial in several situations. Many individuals
favor the use of DDA during times of economic crisis because it enables
the quicker decision-making that is necessary to address the constantly
evolving economic climate. 48 DDA is additionally seen to be beneficial in
situations involving legislative deadlock, particularly when the legisla49
tion's subject matter is contentious and politically unpopular.
B. WHAT DDA Is NOT
To better understand what DDA is, it is important to understand what
DDA is not. Nearly every democracy in the world provides its Executive
with some constitutional authority to issue decrees that affect the status
quo of the nation.50 This broad grant of decree authority is known as
"constitutional decree authority" (CDA).i 1 Within the broad grant of
CDA exist several different decree powers, one of which is DDA. 5 2 Thus,
it is necessary to recognize that while DDA is a part of the broad package
of CDA, it is only one small component of it, and, as such, it is necessary
to distinguish DDA from the other forms of constitutional decree
authority.
43. See Crisp, supra note 3, at 148.
44. See id.
45. As will be later shown, pre-approval DDA has been used by Chavez in Venezuela
as a tool to compliment the country's constitutional re-writing process.
46. Brian Sala, The U.S. Presidency in Comparative Perspective, in ExicuVi DieCREE Aurniojrry 254, 256 (John Carey & Matthew Shugart eds., 1998).
47. Id.
48. See William E. Scheuerman, Exception and Emergency Powers: The Economic
State of Emergency, 21 CARDozo L. Rjv. 1869, 1892 (2000). "[It is no surprise
that even liberal polities tend to delegate vast discretionary authority to executive. . .bodies typically seen as better suited to the tasks of quick, flexible forms of
action" in capitalist economies. Id.
49. Sala, supra note 46, at 256.
50. Carey & Shugart, supra note 4, at 10.
51. Id. at 13-14.
52. Id. at 13.
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First, DDA is not "regulatory" decree authority, which permits the Executive to enact decrees to ensure the enforcement of pre-existing legislation.5 3 Second, DDA is not "administrative" decree authority, which
allows the Executive to manage the effectiveness of the federal government. 54 Although both "regulatory" and "administrative" decrees can affect the status quo through rules and regulations, "these decrees are not
the law; they are subordinate to the law."55 Moreover, it is often much
easier to annul regulatory and administrative decrees than it is to annul a
DDA decree.5 6 Finally, and most importantly, regulatory and administrative decree authority does not involve the Executive-Legislative interplay
that is present under DDA. Instead, the Executive can act upon regulatory and administrative decree authority without Legislative
involvement.5 7
DDA also differentiates from decrees enacted under "emergency powers," which allow the Executive to suspend specific constitutional rights
during a time of national security or economic emergency.58 A major
difference between emergency decrees and DDA is that emergency decrees are temporary in nature to cure the national crisis and typically expire once the emergency threat has been extinguished. 59 DDA, on the
other hand, is a permanent change in the status quo that can only be
removed through future legislative action. 60 A simple way to distinguish
the two according to Mainwaring and Shugart is "if the power is understood as enabling the president to new policy departures, we call it
[DDA]. If it is understood to pertain to temporary suspension of some
rights, we call it emergency power." 6 1
It is, additionally, important to clarify the difference between an economic emergency and DDA that is used during times of economic crisis.
This distinction is important because economic crises have been the main
rationale for DDA in Latin America's history, as can be seen through the
neo-liberal "shock treatments" that occurred in the late 1980s and early
1990s in Latin America. 62 The most notable difference is that whereas
DDA used to solve an economic crisis results in permanent, long-lasting
economic laws that remain in force until they are overturned by a later
administration, decrees enacted during a state of economic emergency
cease once the emergency ends.6 3 Moreover, decrees enacted under an
economic emergency often lack the Executive-Legislative interplay that is
essential to DDA. For instance, while an economic emergency may be
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Mainwaring & Shugart, supra note 31, at 46.
Id.
Carey & Shugart, supra note 4, at 13.
Id.
See Mainwaring & Shugart, supra note 31, at 46.
Id. at 46-47.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 47.
Rubio & Goretti, supra note 3, at 38; Scheuerman, supra note 48, at 1872.
Scheuerman, supra note 48, at 1872.
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declared by the Executive without legislative involvement, DDA used
during an economic crisis always involves legislative approval.64
To truly understand DDA, it is necessary to conceptualize how DDA
fits within CDA. Figure 2 below is a conceptualization of CDA, containing DDA, emergency decrees, administrative decrees, and regulatory decrees. Moreover, each sub-category contains its own group of "sub-subcategories" of decree authority. For example, DDA includes both preapproval and post-approval DDA. Alternatively, emergency decree authority includes both states of emergency and economic emergencies.
Accordingly, it is necessary to understand that while DDA is CDA, CDA
is not always DDA.
Moreover, the space outside of these specific categories of CDA consists of the "gray" area of CDA. This "gray" area is important because
Executives may have a constitutional right to issue decrees that do not
cleanly fit into any of the above-described categories. Nonetheless, Executives have used this "gray" area to enact decrees that do, in fact, change
the nation's status quo. Such examples of the ability to issue decrees in
this "gray" area include the creation of national companies, the canceling
of contracts with private companies, and even the nationalization of private industry.65 This "gray" area may become the most worrisome form
of CDA in the future, as the only true constraints of the Executive's use
of this decree authority is a country's Supreme Court, which may be hesitant to invalidate an Executive's decree due to political or social pressures. Although this "gray" area of CDA is beyond the scope of the
current analysis, further investigation into the prevalence of "gray" area
should be made to further develop and understand CDA's nuances.
Figure 2: CDA

64. See id. at 1881.
65. See generally Decretos Emitidos de Ecuador de Periodo 2009-2013 [Decrees issued
in Ecuador from 2009-2013], SIGOB, http://www.sigob.gov.ec/decretos/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2011).
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C.

CRITIQUE

OF CURRENT THEORY OF DDA

Although I agree with the majority of the current literature regarding
DDA, I must clarify what I consider to be two problems with the current
state of DDA analysis. First, some authors argue that post-approval
DDA is not a form of DDA, but instead a separate form of CDA. The
rationale behind their argument is that because the decree is made without prior Legislative approval, the only authority permitting such a decree is the constitution, thus leading to CDA. I reject such an argument
because it ignores the fact that both pre-approval and post-approval
DDA are constitutionally provided for. Without the constitutional grant,
it would be unlawful for a nation's Legislature to grant DDA, in any
form, to the Executive. Moreover, the argument further ignores the fact
that in both pre-approval and post-approval DDA the decrees are without effect without Legislative approval of some form. Thus, while postapproval DDA allows the Executive to promulgate decrees without Legislative approval, those decrees enjoy the force of law only after the Executive-Legislative interplay occurs. It is this Executive-Legislative
interplay that makes DDA unique from the other forms of CDA and
what makes post-approval DDA a form of DDA.
Second, although Mainwaring and Shugart provide an accurate analysis
of the prevalence of DDA within Latin America, the authors fail in their
attempt to distinguish between the dangers of pre-approval and post-approval DDA. They argue that post-approval DDA provides a greater
danger than pre-approval DDA because pre-approval DDA involves a
situation where "what congress delegates it can retract-or it can choose
to not delegate in the first place." 66 On the other hand, the Legislature is
not free to retract post-approval DDA from the Executive, but instead
must wait to react once the Executive has issued such a decree. 67 As a
result, the authors argue that Latin American Legislatures are more
tightly bound by post-approval DDA since the Legislature's powers are
retroactive and not proactive.6 9 The authors' distinction turns out to be
weak as both pre-approval and post-approval DDA involve situations
where the Legislature is tightly bound by Executive action. In pre-approval DDA, the Legislature is bound by all decrees promulgated by the
Executive under the DDA grant. 69 Meanwhile, post-approval DDA
bounds the Legislature by requiring a response to the Executive's decree. 70 Additionally, the authors' argument that post-approval DDA
grants the Executive far more power than pre-approval DDA fails because the substantive scope of both forms of DDA are limited by a na66. See Mainwaring & Shugart, supra note 31, at 47.
67. See id.
68. The authors cite to Article 62 of Brazil's 1988 Constitution as such an example.
The Article permits an Executive to adopt "provisional measures" that must be
immediately sent to Congress and are deemed ineffective unless they are approved
by Congress within thirty days. Id. at 44.
69. See id. at 46-47.
70. Id.
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tion's constitution, which tends to provide the Executive roughly the
same scope of activity to decree new legislation.
I reject Mainwaring and Shugart's arguments and argue that pre-approval DDA currently contains a greater likelihood of abuse than postapproval DDA since many nations have amended their constitutions to
provide the Legislature with greater power to nullify post-approval DDA.
Although pre-approval DDA permits the Legislature to "choose not to
delegate the power in the first place," pre-approval DDA requires the
Legislature to take much more action than post-approval DDA to rescind
any decree, even when the Executive exceeds the established boundaries
given by the Legislature.71 Moreover, as Executives have further consolidated power within the Legislative branch through new constitutions and
the creation of a unicameral legislative branch, they have helped ensure
that grants of pre-approval DDA provide the Executive with broader
powers. 7 2 Thus, as more assembly seats are won by an Executive's political allies, the greater the likelihood that the Executive will be granted
continually larger pre-approval DDA powers.
I do not mean to say that post-approval DDA poses no danger to democracy, but that, currently, post-approval DDA is not as dangerous as
pre-approval DDA. While pre-approval DDA powers have been broadened over time, post-approval DDA powers have been constrained by
constitutional changes providing longer time periods to address post-approval DDA decrees, and by restrictions on the use of the Executive's
post-approval DDA to one decree at a time, except during states of emergency. 7 3 Accordingly, it is more difficult for the Executive to inundate
the Legislature with post-approval DDA decrees, thereby forcing decrees
into law simply because the Legislature is incapable of handling the legislative load within the constitutional time-frame. Finally, and possibly the
most important characteristic, post-approval DDA is often constitutionally limited in terms of scope to areas of economic necessity, while the
scope of pre-approval DDA can be left to the whims of the majority legislation. 74 Thus, even while post-approval DDA can absolutely be abused
under certain situations, the likelihood of abuse is much less than in preapproval DDA.
D.

DOEs

DDA THREATEN

THE RULE OF LAW?

Theoretically, DDA's threat to the rule of law differs dramatically between pre-approval and post-approval DDA. 7 5 Before beginning a theo71. But, it is fair to note that the authors' work was conducted before the ChAvez era
in Venezuela, which has showcased an Executive's ability to consolidate substantial power through pre-appToval DDA.
72. See Crisp, supra note 3, at 149-50.
73. Mainwaring & Shugart, supra note 31, at 444; RiiuI3LIC OF ECUADOR CONsTrruTION OF 2008 art. 140.
74. Mainwaring & Shugart, supra note 31, at 444.

75. The following subsection involves a theoretical analysis over pre-approval and
post-approval DDA's threat to the rule of law. Because this is solely a theoretical
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retical analysis of DDA's threat to the rule of law, it is important to note
that DDA does not threaten the rule of law's requirement that "laws matter." This is because once a DDA decree has been granted the force of
law through the Executive-Legislative interplay, the Executive decrees
are facially no different from any other law. Because DDA does not undermine the rule of law's requirement that "laws matter," the focus of
DDA's threat to the rule of law is on "horizontal accountability" and
"formal equality."
1. Pre-Approval DDA
Pre-approval DDA, in general, threatens the rule of law. First, preapproval DDA threatens the rule of law in that it can provide little horizontal accountability. After the pre-approval DDA grant, an Executive,
particularly a strong charismatic leader, can issue decrees without being
held accountable for how he uses his DDA powers. So long as the Executive acts within the DDA grant's boundaries, he can decree whatever he
chooses. Moreover, even when the Executive acts outside the DDA
grant's boundaries, the Legislature or opposition must take affirmative
action to hold the Executive accountable. Such action, often done
through a new law annulling the decree, may take months, thereby allowing the Executive's unconstitutional decree to become the nation's
status quo for that time period.76
Pre-approval DDA also threatens the rule of law because it denies
"formal equality" as it is a departure from the "carefully dictated procedures" that are present in other forms of legislation.7 7 In a sense, preapproval DDA is the exception to the procedures that allow the rule of
law to succeed since Executives can issue decrees with the force of law
that have not been discussed with the Legislature or are not even in writing at the time of the decree. This lack of formal equality is particularly
evident when the Executive is granted DDA by a majority Legislature.
In such a situation, the majority Legislature can effectively exclude the
opposition from any discussion regarding the scope and time-length of
the DDA grant. Moreover, the Executive, after the DDA grant, has the
ability to issue decrees without having to discuss the content of the legislation with minority parties. As a result, the political opposition is denied
their voice both before and during the pre-approval DDA grant.7 8
Furthermore, pre-approval DDA's process of stifling opposition participation is significant as it can create a downward spiral of opposition participation and threaten both democracy and the rule of law. First,
horizontal accountability disappears as the Legislature, particularly minority parties, demonstrates an incapacity or unwillingness to prevent the
analysis, the analysis does not look at how DDA's practical use threatens the rule
of law. Such an analysis is included in a later section.
76. See Mainwaring & Shugart, supra note 31, at 444.
77. See O'Donnell, supra note 16, at 33.
78. See id.
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Executive from obtaining lawmaking powers and issuing decrees without
legislative involvement.79 In turn, voters, viewing the DDA decrees as
being arbitrary and believing that their votes no longer count, decide to
abstain from voting. This decrease in voter participation enables the majority, including the Executive, to become more powerful through greater
election results, which, in turn, allows the Executive to obtain continuously broader DDA powers. As a result, an asymmetric equilibrium
forms where only one political voice determines the country's status quo,
damaging the rule of law and democracy.
2.

Post-Approval DDA

Post-approval DDA's threat to the rule of law is significantly less than
pre-approval DDA's threat. This difference occurs because laws enacted
under post-approval DDA still follow carefully dictated procedures: all
post-approval DDA decrees must go through the Legislature before they
obtain the force of law, post-approval DDA, unlike pre-approval DDA,
specifically allows for legislative involvement regarding the content of the
Executive's decree. Such legislative involvement inherently provides opposition leaders the opportunity to voice their opinion. Moreover, legislative involvement also ensures that horizontal accountability is in effect,
as a Legislature can simply reject or modify the Executive's decree when
they believe that the Executive is acting outside of his post-approval
DDA powers.
At the same time post-approval DDA provides greater protections for
the rule of law, it can also threaten the rule of law in several ways. Because post-approval DDA provides the Legislature a limited time-frame
to respond to the Executive's decree, the Legislature must prioritize sections of the decree. Thus, the Legislature is often able to address only the
major issues of the proposed law, which, in turn, means that it must ignore much of the law's text.
Post-approval DDA is also problematic when the Executive enjoys
strong majority support within the Legislature, which can effectively silence the political opposition in a manner similar to that under pre-approval DDA. Because the majority party or coalition often sets the
legislative agenda and schedule, the majority can manipulate the schedule
to limit minority participation by providing little to no public discussion
over the Executive decree.
Finally, post-approval DDA can be problematic when the Executive
inundates the Legislature with a continuous stream of decrees. While
more recent constitutions have limited an Executive's ability to inundate
the Legislature with decrees by prohibiting the Legislature from having
more than one post-approval decree at a time, the Executive can limit
legislative action through constant decrees. For instance, the Executive
can disrupt any agenda a Legislature may have by constantly sending de79. See id. at 37.
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crees. Because the Legislature must act on the Executive's decree within
a certain time-period, it will continually have to reserve more resources
to respond to the Executive's decrees, leaving the Legislature less time
towards drafting its own laws. Accordingly, by sending a continuous
stream of decrees to the Legislature, the Executive effectively places itself as the country's primary lawmaker, thereby limiting the Legislature's
lawmaking authority.
IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL GRANTS OF DDA IN VENEZUELA
AND ECUADOR

As previously mentioned, a nation's constitution scopes the boundaries
of the Executive's DDA powers. The text can limit the duration of a preapproval DDA or how many decrees an Executive can send at any moment under post-approval DDA.8 0 The text can also limit the scope of
DDA to only economic or financial areas or be left intentionally vague to
permit DDA in all areas of society.8 1 While the constitutional language
does not dictate how DDA is used in practice, it provides guidelines as to
how much power an Executive can consolidate under DDA.
The following analysis provides textual comparisons of the old and new
constitutions in Venezuela and Ecuador. Because the new constitutions
of Venezuela and Ecuador were drafted under the tutelage of ChAvez and
Correa, respectively, such a comparison permits us to view if, and how,
these leaders crafted the new constitutions to provide themselves greater
DDA powers. Accordingly, Venezuela's analysis involves the country's
1961 and 1999 Constitutions, while Ecuador's analysis includes the country's 1998 and 2008 Constitutions.
A.

VENEZUELAN

DDA-THE

"ENABLING LAW"

1. 1961 Constitution's DDA
Venezuela's 1961 Constitution provided its Executives pre-approval
DDA powers. 82 Article 190, Section 8 provided the Executive to power
to make decrees in economic or financial matters when the public interest
required it and when it had been authorized by "special law." 8 3 What is
notable in Venezuela's 1961 Constitution is that there are few limitations
on this DDA grant. Aside from limiting the scope of DDA to economic
or financial matters, there is no limitation on the time-length of the "special law." 84 Instead, the time-length of the DDA grants was limited to the
Legislature's discretion.85
80. See REPUBiC OF EcuAooR CONSrITUTION oi- 2008 art. 140.
81. See Crisp, supra note 3, at 166.
82. RiPumic OF VFNEZUELA CONSTITUnON oiF 1961 art. 190, § 8 (reformed in 1983).
83. Id.

84. Id.
85. Even though the 1961 Constitution is silent on who has the authority to promul-

gate the "special law," past practice shows that the Legislative branch had the sole
authority to promulgate such a law. See Crisp, supra note 3, at 146-49.
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2.

1999 Constitution's DDA

After Chivez became president in 1998, he acted upon his campaign
promise to re-write Venezuela's constitution. 86 During the 1999 re-writing process, Chavez actively sought to increase the scope and power of
Venezuela's DDA because, to ChAvez, the enabling law was the "Mother
of All Laws," which could enable him to bring social revolution to Venezuelan society.87 For Chavez, the enabling law went hand-in-hand with
constitutional change, as the Constitution could bring large-scale change,
while the Enabling Law could bring specific change. In fact, ChAvez said:
The Enabling Law and the Constitutional Reform are like two sister
motors, two motors of the same machine. It is required that we coordinate the two quickly because there are laws that we have in mind
that will only be possible when the reform is done, when part of the
constitution is reformed.8 8
Similar to the 1961 Constitution, Venezuela's 1999 Constitution provides the Executive pre-approval DDA powers.89 Article 203 states that
the National Assembly, with three-fifths support of its members, can authorize the Executive to enact decrees limited in time and scope under an
"enabling law." 90 Moreover, Article 236, Section 8 provides the Executive the power to dictate, with previous authorization under an "enabling
law," decrees with the force of law. 91 Much like the 1961 Constitution,
the 1999 Constitution is vague about the time-length of the DDA powers,
leaving it to the Legislature's discretion. 92 Unlike the 1961 Constitution,
however, the 1999 Constitution contains no textual language limiting
DDA to economic or financial matters, permitting the Legislature to
grant DDA powers in all areas of society. 9 3
3.

Comparing The 1961 And 1999 Constitutions

When comparing the two Constitutions, it is clear that Chdvez and
Venezuela's 1999 Constitution increased the Executive's DDA powers.
Although both Constitutions contained no time limits on the DDA grant,
the 1999 Constitution provides the Executive a much broader scope of
DDA powers since there is no limitation on solely economic or financial
matters. 94 Thus, the 1999 Constitution, which leaves the scope of the
86. See Clifton Ross, Constitutions and Coups: The Honduras Case, PM PREss, Oct.
29, 2010, http://www.pmpress.org/content/article.php/20090629100908408.
87. Stacy Rentner, Venezueula: How a HydroCarbonsLaw Crippled an Oil Giant, 27
HASTINGS INT'L & CoMr. L. Riv. 351, 360 (2004).
88. Chris Carlson, Controversy Surrounds 69 Articles in the Reform of Venezuela's

89.

Constitution, VHEADIANE, Nov. 24, 2007, http://www.vheadline.com/printer-news.
asp?id=77061.
See REPUBUIC O VENEZUVELA CONSTITUTION OF 1999 art. 22%, § 8.

90. Id. The 1961 Constitution was vague as to whether a majority or three-fifths support was required.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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DDA grant to the Legislature's discretion, effectively provides the Executive DDA powers in any and every facet of society.
B.

ECUADORAN

DDA-"EL

PROYEC-TO URGENTE"

1. 1998 Constitution's DDA
Ecuador's 1998 Constitution granted the Executive post-approval
DDA. 95 Article 155 provided the Executive the authority to send economically urgent legislation, or proyectos urgentes, to the National Congress. 9 6 Once received, the National Congress had thirty days to approve,
modify, or deny the proyecto urgente.97 If the National Congress failed to
act within this thirty day period, the Executive's proposed legislation became law.9 8
Article 155 also provided that the Executive could only send one
proyecto urgente at a time, except during a state of emergency.9 9 Accordingly, the Executive had to wait thirty days or until the Legislature was
finished with the previous proyecto urgente before sending another.
2. 2008 Constitution'sDDA
Ecuador's 2008 Constitution did little to change the Executive's DDA
power. Similar to the 1998 Constitution, Article 140 of the Constitution
provides the Executive post-approval DDA powers as he can send
proyectos urgentes to the National Assembly.10 0 Once the National Assembly receives the proyecto urgente, they have up to thirty days to approve, modify, or reject the proposed legislation.1 01 If the National
Assembly does not take proper action within the thirty day time period,
the Executive can issue a decree making the proyecto urgente law.102 After the Executive's decree, the National Assembly has the authority to
3
modify or revoke the law just as if it is any other law.10
Like the 1998 Constitution, the 2008 Constitution prohibits the Executive from sending more than one proyecto urgente at a time, except during
states of emergency.'0 Thus, Ecuador's Executive cannot inundate the
National Assembly with proyectos urgentes to effectively bypass the
thirty-day requirement.
95.

RE-PuBUic oF ECUADOR CONSTITUTION OF 1998 art. 155.

96. Id.
97. Id.

98. Id.
99. Id.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

See RYi'uieuc ov EcuAnoR CONswVuUToN o 2008 art. 140.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Compare Rireun1ic o- ECUADOR CONsTrruIoN oF. 1998 art. 155, with REPUBIiiC
OF ECUADOR CONSTIrUnON oi, 2008 art. 140.
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3.

Comparing the 1998 and 2008 Constitutions

Comparing the 1998 and 2008 Constitutions, Ecuador's DDA powers
are essentially identical. In fact, the only difference between the two constitutions is that the 2008 Constitution explicitly authorizes the Executive
to decree the proyecto urgente into law after thirty days, whereas the 1998
Constitution did not explicitly authorize such Executive action. 0 5 Nonetheless, the end result of both the 1998 and 2008 Constitutions is the
same, with all proyectos urgentes becoming law after being in the Legislature for more than thirty days. Based on this comparison, we see that
Rafael Correa, unlike Chavez, did not use Ecuador's 2008 constitutional
re-writing process to grant himself broader DDA powers.
OVERALL ANALYSIS OF DDA AMONG THESE COUNTRIES

C.

The constitutions of Venezuela and Ecuador provide very different
forms of DDA. One country-Venezuela-permits pre-approval DDA,
while one country-Ecuador-permits post-approval DDA. Moreover,
in Venezuela there is a broad and powerful form of DDA, while Ecuador
provides its Executive with a narrower, but still powerful, form of DDA
that enables the Executive to send proyectos urgentes to the Legislature.
The previous analysis further shows how Chivez used the 1999 Constituent Assembly to substantially broaden his DDA powers. In fact, prior
limitations on Ch6vez' DDA powers have been removed altogether, as
the scope of his DDA powers are limited only by Venezuela's Legislature,
which is controlled by Chivez' allies. 106
On the other hand, Correa acted with restraint during Ecuador's 2008
constitutional re-writing process. Instead of granting the Executive preapproval DDA, Correa maintained the status quo and limited Ecuador's
2008 Constitution to post-approval DDA.1 07 Moreover, the 2008 Constitution continues to limit the use of post-approval DDA to economically
urgent matters and provides the Legislature thirty days to respond to any
particular proyecto urgente. 0 8 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Ecuador's 2008 Constitution continues to prohibit the Executive from inundating the Legislature with Executive decrees by limiting the Executive
105.

Compare REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR CONSTITUTION OF 1998 art. 155, with RFPUBIC

OF

ECUADOR CONSTITUTION oF 2008 art. 140.

106. The 1961 Constitution's restriction en materia econdmica o financiera [in economic
or financial matters] is not in the 1999 Constitution, thereby leaving the National

Assembly, which issues "Enabling Laws," the only body that can restrict the powers of presidential decrees. Compare REPBuuc OF VENEZUELA CONsTIUTION OF
1999 art. 236,

§ 8,

with REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA CONSTITUTION OF 1961 art. 190,

§8 (reformed in 1983).
107. Under both constitutions, the President must submit decrees to the Legislature for
approval, modification, or rejection. Compare RiiUnLIc or ECUADOR CONSTITUTION OF 2008 art. 140, with RFPuM.ic or ECUADOR CONSTrrrUTION OF 1998 art.
155.

108. The first sentence of article 140 retains the en materia econdmica [in economic
matters] restriction. RFeruuic OF ECUADOR CONSTITUriON OF 2008 art. 140.
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to one proyecto urgente at a time.109
V. DDA IN PRACTICE IN VENEZUELA AND ECUADOR
While constitutional text establishes DDA's boundaries, the text does
not explain how DDA is used in practice. For example, the constitutional
language does not explain how often a Legislature grants pre-approval
DDA to its Executive, or how often an Executive uses his post-approval
DDA powers. Moreover, the constitutional text does not show how
broad or long any particular DDA grant is. The following analysis addresses these issues in Venezuela and Ecuador. For each country, the
analysis includes two eras: (1) the pre-leader era-i.e., Chfivez and Correa; and (2) the leader era. By focusing on these two eras, this analysis
seeks to determine how DDA has been used by these modern leaders and
if these leaders have used their DDA powers differently from their
predecessors.
A.
1. Pre-Chdvez

VENEZUELA

Era 10

Possibly more than any other Latin American nation, Venezuela has
had a strong history of granting its Executive DDA through its "enabling
law." From 1961, the first year of Venezuela's former constitution, to
1998, the Venezuelan Legislature granted the enabling law five times."'
Three of the enabling laws occurred when the Executive enjoyed majority
support within the Legislature: in 1961, 1974, and 1984.112 Each enabling
law granted the Executive DDA for one year in areas designed to restructure the public administration and address financial and economic issues.'1 3 Although these areas were relatively broad, they often included
specific guidelines, limiting the substantive scope of the Executive's decrees to areas specifically stated in the legislative grant. 114 During the
period in which these three enabling laws were in effect, the Executives
enacted fifteen, fifty-three, and seventy-one decrees, respectively.' 15 The
decrees were restricted to financial, economic, and public administration
areas, such as distributing oil wealth, cutting public salaries, restructuring
the central government, enacting new tax laws, issuing government
109. Id.
110. The following analysis of the pre-Chivez era is not intended to be as in-depth as
the ChAvez-era analysis. This is because the use of DDA during the pre-Chivez
era has been thoroughly chronicled by Brian Crisp. See generally Crisp, supra note
3.
111. See id. at 146-50; see also Mario J. Garcia-Serra, The "Enabling Law": The Demise of the Separation of Powers in Hugo Chavez's Venezuela, 32 U. MIAMI INIeRAM. L. REv. 265, 278 (2001).

112.
113.
114.
115.

Crisp, supra note 3, at 148-49.
See id. at 146-49.
Id.; see also G arcia-Serra, supra note 111, at 278.
It is important to note that thirty-six of the seventy-one decrees were used for the
purpose of selling government bonds to refinance the public debt. Crisp, supra
note 3, at 146-149.

2011]DELEGATED DECREE AUTHORITY IN SO. AMERICA 249
bonds, and nationalizing the country's iron ore industry.116
The remaining two times the Legislature issued an enabling law from
1961 to 1998 were when the Executive enjoyed minority support in the
Legislature. 117 These grants occurred in 1993 and 1994 and were used by
the majority Legislature to force the Executive to deal with unpopular or
difficult economic legislation."r8 Due to the minority support, the DDA
grants involved a narrower scope of power, the decrees were more closely
scrutinized by the Legislature, and the length of the DDA grant was significantly less.11 9 For example, the 1993 enabling law lasted six months,
while the 1994 enabling lasted only thirty days.12 0 Because the minoritysupported Executives were given far less freedom in their decree making,
the Executives enacted only thirteen decrees in 1993 and four decrees in
1994.121 Due to the limited scope of the enabling laws, the decrees
largely consisted of banking reform, the sale of the national airline, and
unpopular taxes.12 2 Of significant importance, however, was that the
Legislature, in granting these enabling laws, narrowly permitted the Executives to create criminal sanctions for disobeying the decrees.123 The
1993 and 1994 enabling laws were the only instances under the 1961 Constitution where the Legislature granted the Executive power to modify
the nation's criminal code through decrees.124
Although DDA was relatively common in the pre-Chivez era, the enabling laws were limited in several important respects. Professor Brian
Crisp notes four important aspects of Venezuela's pre-Chivez DDA.12 5
First, "the [1961 Venezuelan] Constitution restrict[ed DDA] to economic
and financial matters." 126 Second, the time for which the authority had
been granted was limited to a maximum of twelve months. 127 Third, legislatively provided instructions regarding the scope of DDA became more
and more detailed over time, as was seen in the 1974, 1984, 1993, and
1994 DDAs.128 Finally, "the provisions for [legislative] oversight [were]
fairly rigorous."1 29 Thus, although the Executive was granted the power
to enact decrees with the force of law for upwards of a year, the Executive's ability to enact far-sweeping changes was restricted by the Legisla116. Brian F. Crisp, Presidential Behavior in a System With Strong Parties: Venezuela
1958-1995, in Exiecu-ivE DECRE

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Matthew S. Shugart eds., 1997).
Crisp, supra note 3, at 149-51.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 149-50.
Id. at 150-51.
Id. at 149-51.
Id. at 150.
Id. at 149-50.
Id. at 154.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

AUTHORITY 182, 187-89 (John M. Carey &
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ture. Moreover, we see that the Executive-Legislative interplay was
balanced in favor of the Legislature during this time-period.
Despite the trend of providing more legislative oversight over the Executive decrees, one problematic aspect that developed was when the
1993 and 1994 enabling laws permitted the Executive to decree changes
to the nation's criminal code.130 These enabling laws created a dangerous
precedent, making it appropriate for Venezuela's Legislature to grant the
authority to change the country's criminal law to the Executive through
DDA.
2.

Chdvez Era

Hugo Chivez has been granted DDA powers three times since he became President in February 1999.131 The first enabling law occurred
under the framework of the 1961 Constitution, while the other two grants
occurred under the 1999 Constitution.13 2 Because the constitutional
framework between these two eras is different, the following section will
first address the DDA grant under the 1961 Constitution and will then
address the DDA grants under the 1999 Constitution.
a. DDA Grant Under the 1961 Constitution
Venezuela's Legislature first granted ChAvez DDA powers on April 26,
1999, to issue decrees in economic and financial matters for six months. 33
While this time length and scope of the grant of DDA was not unusual in
itself, the process by which ChAvez obtained this grant is worth noting.
Shortly after Chivez became President in February 1999, he demanded
a six-month enabling law to address the country's economic crisis due to
decreased oil prices.134 Congress, in response to ChAvez' request, drafted
and approved an enabling law.135 ChAvez, however, rejected Congress'
first version of the enabling law, arguing that it did not provide him broad
enough powers to properly face the economic situation.136 ChAvez then
threatened to declare a state of emergency and rule by decree if Con130. See id. at 150.
131.

132.
133.

134.

135.
136.

Democracy and Human Rights in Venezuela, INTER-AMERICAN COMM'N ON
HUMAN RiGires, s 325, http://www.cidh.oas.org/countryreplVenezuela2009eng/

VEO9CHAPIIIENG.htm#B (last visited Jan. 12, 2011) (providing a brief temporal
history of the use of DDA under Chivez).
Id. 11 325-26.
Id. $ 325. The 1999 grant of DDA to ChAvez has not been thoroughly covered.
There are two possible explanations for this lack of coverage. First, it can be in
part due to the relevant lack of accessible information regarding Presidential decrees prior to 2000. Second, the 1999 enabling law could have been largely overlooked due to Chivez' subsequent use of a much broader forms of DDA granted
under the 1999 Constitution.
Larry Rohter, Venezuela's New Leader: Democrat or Dictator?, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr.
10, 1999, at A3. To show how much Venezuela's oil sector was hurting, oil prices
were $7 a barrel when ChAvez entered office, compared to the $80 a barrel or
more now. Id.
Id.
Id.
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gress, also facing the threat of being dissolved by the Constituent Assembly referendum, did not approve his own version of the enabling law. 137
Congress balked under Chivez' threats, sending Chivez a much
broader version of the enabling law on April 22, 1999.138 Congress, however, did not grant Chivez the authority to issues decrees regarding the
country's Hydrocarbons Law, which controlled the nation's oil
reserves.13 9 Even without the Hydrocarbons law, Chivez accepted the
second version and backed away from his threat to declare a state of
emergency. 140
Under the 1999 enabling law, ChAvez enacted fifty-four decrees that
were limited to economic and financial matters.141 Many of the decrees
were innocuous. Those decrees included restructuring the country's tax
system to decrease the federal government's dependency on oil income, 142 cutting the nation's short-term debt, and reforming the nation's
public administration to promote government efficiency.1 43 At the same
time ChAvez cut back on government programs, however, he increased
government salaries by twenty percent.1 44 While the enabling law specifically authorized Chdvez to raise government salaries by twenty percent,
such a grant was likely crafted by Chivez to promote a clientelistic relationship between he and the public sector.
Furthermore, Chivez modified the nation's Natural Gas Law, in what
appears to be the complete opposite of his later economic ideology, to
encourage $10 billion of foreign investment in Venezuela's natural gas
sector.14 5 The decree established a new pricing system to ensure returns
on investment and set the general income tax on natural gas profits to
thirty-four percent, subject to tax credits for new investments.' 4 6
While Chivez' decrees enacted under the enabling law were consistent
with those of his predecessors, the 1999 grant of DDA reveals a change in
control over the DDA grant from the Legislature to the Executive. The
137. Id.
138. See Garcia-Serra,supra note 111, at 274-75; Govt. Excludes Oil Bill From Enabling
Law, Bus. Niws AMs., Apr. 23, 1999, http://www.bnamericas.com/news/oilandgas/
Govt,_ExcludesOilBill-fromEnablingLaw; Laurie Goering, Venezuela's Charismatic Leader on a Roll But Some Worry as New President Adds to Powers, CmCAGO TRIBUNE , Apr. 25, 1999, at 4. The new enabling law granted ChAivez 90-95%
of what he wanted. Id.
139. Govt. Excludes Oil Bill From Enabling Law, supra note 138.
140. Goering, supra note 138, at 4.
141. Democracy and Human Rights in Venezuela, supra note 131.
142. Testimony of the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: Hearing on Tax Treaties and Protocols with Eight
Countries, JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION (1999), available at https://www.jct.gov/
publications.html?func=startdown&id=2828 (testimony of Lindy Paul).
143. Congress Approves Enabling Law: President May Reject its Terms, BBC SumMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS (Apr. 26, 1999).
144. President Raises Public Sector Wages, Sends Two Tax Laws To Congress, BBC
SUMMARY OF WORIto BROADCASTS (May 4, 1999).
145. Uisdean R. Vass & Ruben E. Lujan, Venezuela Hatching Big Plansfor Jump-Starting Natural Gas Sector, 97:32 OIL & GAS 1. 48, at *4-*6, Aug. 9, 1999.
146. Id.
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fact that Chdvez held the Legislature hostage and demanded that Congress enact the broader enabling law that he drafted himself reveals that
Venezuela's Legislature no longer controlled the DDA grant. Instead, by
placing such control in the Executive's hands, the 1999 enabling law created a dangerous precedent whereby the Executive-Legislative interplay
became far more limited and one-sided in favor of the Executive.
DDA Grants Under the 1999 Constitution

b.

Since the 1999 Constitution, ChAvez has been granted DDA powers
two times. The first time occurred in 2000, shortly after the passing of the
1999 Constitution. 14 7 The second time was in 2007, while Chivez was,
once again, attempting to re-write Venezuela's Constitution. 14 8
i. 2000 Enabling Law
In November 2000, Venezuela's Legislature granted ChAvez an enabling law for one year in a broad range of areas, including: (1) finance;
(2) the economy and society; (3) infrastructure; (4) personal and legal
security; (5) science and technology; and (6) civil service. 149 Although
the time length of the enabling law was no longer than previous enabling
laws, the scope was far broader than the prior constitutional limitations of
economic and financial matters. As such, ChAvez could effectively control all aspects of the nation through these six designated areas. Finally, a
Commission was created to monitor and receive Chavez' decrees.1 50
Chivez enacted forty-nine decrees under the 2000 enabling law to support his "Plan Bolivar."151 The majority of the decrees were uncontroversial: many involved modernizing industries, 152 declaring
sovereignty and providing better security over Venezuela's natural resources, and promoting investment in science and technology.1 53 Chivez
additionally enacted several decrees providing greater consumer protections by holding businesses and individuals accountable for fraudulent or
unethical behavior.x5 4
147.
148.
149.
150.

151.
152.
153.

154.

Democracy and Human Rights in Venezuela, supra note 131.
Id. 326.
Id. 2 325.
The Commission was argued to be useless considering the majority support ChAivez maintained in Congress and the Commission. National Assembly Passes Enabling Law Granting President Chdvez Special Powers, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD
BROADCASTS (Nov. 9, 2000).
Democracy and Human Rights in Venezuela, supra note 131; see also Rule by Decree Passedfor Chdvez, BBC Ni7ws, Jan. 19,2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/
americas/6277379.stm.
See, e.g., Decreto No. 1.446, de 18 de Septiembre de 2001, GACETA OFICIAL DE LA
REPUBLICA BOU-iVARIANA DE VENEZUELA, No. 37.291, de 28 de Septiembre de
2001, available at http://www.gobiernoenlinea.ve/docMgr/sharedfiles/209.pdf.
Decreto No. 1.290, Titulo VI, Capitulo I, de 30 de Agosto de 2001, GACF-TA
OFICIAL DE LA REPUBICA BOI.iVARIANA DE VENEZUELA, No. 37.291, de 26 de
Septiembre de 2001, available at http://www.tsj.gov.ve/gaceta/septiembre/260901/
260901-37291-07.html.
See, e.g., Decreto No. 1.204, Capitulo VIII, de 10 de Febrero de 2001, GACETA
OFICIAL DE LA REPUiU3LCA BOLI-VARIANA DE VENEZUELA, No. 37.148, de 28 de
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Several of Chavez' decrees, however, were extremely controversial, including: the Land Law, the Hydrocarbons Law, and the Fishery Law.
Chivez' Land Law, promulgated with the goal of ending "el latifundio," 5 5 permitted the government to expropriate land that was
deemed to be underutilized or idle.156 The law applied only to plots of
land that exceeded 5,000 hectares.' 5 7 After deemed idle and confiscated,
the land would be redistributed to landless families.15 8 Despite a later
Supreme Court decision finding the law unconstitutional, Chavez has expropriated land from large foreign companies under the legal framework
of the Land Law. 159
Chavez also decreed a new Hydrocarbons Law, which greatly increased
the state's presence in the country's oil industry. 160 The Hydrocarbons
Law required that the state control at least fifty percent of all new oil
developments and increased government royalties on oil profits from
16.7% to thirty percent. 161
ChAvez' other controversial decree was the Fishery Law, which increased taxes on industrial fishing companies by 740 percent.162 Because
the law defined industrial fishing companies to be those that used mechanized systems that are technologically or capital intensive, the law was
viewed as an attack on the commercial and international fishers who
made up roughly twenty-five percent of the nation's fishing industry.163
ChAvez alternately argued that the decree was enacted to protect artisanal fishers, who made up the remaining seventy-five percent of the

155.

156.

157.
158.
159.

Febrero de 2001, available at http://www.tsj.gov.ve/gaceta/febrero/280201/28020137148-15.html.
Decreto No. 1.546, Art. 1, de 9 de Noviembre de 2001, GACETA OFICIAL DE LA
REPUBLICA BoLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA, No. 37.323, de 13 de Noviembre de
2001, available at http://www.tsj.gov.ve/gaceta/noviembre/131101/131101-3732335.html. "El latifundio" refers to the consolidation of large tracts of land into the
hands of few owners. Latifundio, SPANISliDicr, http://www.spanishdict.com/translate/latifundio (last visited Oct. 28, 2010).
See Gregory Wilpert, Land for People Not for Profit in Venezuela, LAN RESEARCH ACrIoN NETWORK, Sept. 20, 2005, http://www.landaction.org/display.php?article=334 (compensation was only required if the land was
expropriated for redistribution); see also Land Reforms Averted Food Crisis in
Venezuela: Chavez, THAINDIAN NEWS, Jan. 22, 2008, http://www.thaindian.com/
newsportal/world-news/land-reforms-averted-food-crisis-in-venezuela-chavez 10
062953.html (land was deemed idle if 80% of the property was not being used).
Wilpert, supra note 156.
See id.
Election,
Id.; see, e.g., Daniel Trotta, Chavez Vows to Radicalize After 2Venezuela
0 03
/ts-nm/us
YAHOO NEWS, Oct. 3, 2010, http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/ 0101
venezuela chavez.

160. Decreto No. 1.510, Capitulo II, de 2 de Noviembre de 2001, GACETA OFICIAL DE
LA REPUBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA, No. 37.323, de 13 de Noviembre de
2001, available at http://www.tsj.gov.ve/gaceta/noviembre/131101/131101-3732305.html.
161. Id. arts. 22, 44; Rentner, supra note 87, at 361-62.
162. See generally Argiris Malapanis & Camilo Catalan, Venezuela Fisherman Fight For
Living Income, MILITANT, Nov. 17, 2003, http://www.themilitant.com/2003/6740/
674060.html.
163. James Suggett, Chavez Signs 26 Law-Decrees on Final Day of Enabling36Law
9
1.
Power, VENEZUELANALYSIS, Aug. 25,2008, http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/
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fishing industry.'6 Thus, while the law was a direct attack on large foreign and domestic commercial interests, it must be noted that the law
provided greater protections for the Venezuelan fishing population,
whose interests were likely being hurt by their larger competitors.
One decree that was more ideologically than practically controversial
was one that promoted the development of cooperative associations.16 5
The decree provided for economic, educational, and public support for
cooperative associations to promote a participatory society. 166 On paper,
it seemed to support the inclusion of more sectors of society into the political process, but ChAvez' opposition saw this as an attempt by ChAvez
to create clientelistic organizations, thereby allowing him to garner more
political support.167 Moreover, the opposition perceived this decree as a
move towards Socialism through its encouragement of socialist
organizations.1 6 8
But, the overwhelming majority of ChAvez' decrees from the 2000 enabling law were uncontroversial-many benefited Venezuelan society in
that they provided greater consumer protections, promoted economic development, and declared sovereignty over Venezuela's natural resources. 169 At the same time, several of Chivez' decrees actively
attacked the interests of large domestic and international corporations.' 7 0
As a result, these industries pushed back, vilifying Chivez as being a socialist and anti-democratic."'7 While those complaints may later ring
true, the level of criticism at that point in Chdvez' career was not entirely
justified.
ii. 2007 Enabling Law
In February 2007, Venezuela's Legislature passed an enabling law prior
to the 2007 constitutional referendum, granting ChAvez DDA for eighteen months-six months longer than any previous enabling law.172 The
enabling law also provided ChAvez a much broader scope of authority
than had ever been granted before, permitting him to enact decrees in
eleven areas, including: (1) energy; (2) infrastructure, transport, and ser164. See Malapanis & Catalan,supra note 162.
165. Decreto No. 1.327, Art. 23, de 1 de Junio de 2001, GACETA O1ICIAL DE LA REPUiIuICA BOLlIVARIANA I VENEZUELA, No. 37.231, de 2 de Julio de 2001, availableat
http://www.tsj.gov.ve/gaceta/julio/020701/020701-37231-06.html.
166. Id.
167. See generally Steve Ellner, A New Model with Rough Edges: Venezuela's Commu2009, available at
nity Councils, NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS, May/June
334 3
18/.
http://findarticles.com/p/artices/mi-gol653/is 200905/ai-n32
168. See generally id.
169. See, e.g., supra notes 153-54.
170. See, e.g., Suggett, supra note 163.
171. See Javier Corrales & Michael Penfold-Becerra, Venezuela: Crowding Out the Opposition, 18 J.or DEMOCRACY 99, 102 (2007).
172. Decreto de 1 de Febrero de 2007, GACETA OFICIAL DE LA REPUnIuCA BouVARIANA DE VENEZUELA, No. 38.617, de 1 de Febrero de 2007, available at http://
www.tsj.gov.ve/gaceta/febrero/010207/010207-38617-01.html
gov.ve/gaceta/febrero/010207/010207-38617-02.htmi.

and

http://www.tsj.
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vices; (3) transformation of the state; (4) economic and social affairs; (5)
finances and taxation; (6) grassroots participation; (7) the exercise of
public office; (8) citizen and judicial security; (9) territorial order; (10)
security and defense; and (11) science and technology. 73 Similar to the
2000 version, the enabling law created a legislative commission to oversee
Chdvez' decree authority.174 Once again, the commission lacked any true
power as it was controlled by ChAvez' supporters. 7 5
In total, ChAvez enacted sixty-seven decrees.176 Similar to the 2000 enabling law, many of ChAvez decrees under the 2007 enabling law were
uncontroversial. For example, ChAvez issued several decrees promoting
development and investment in underdeveloped regions,' 7 7 protecting
the natural environment,1 78 and seeking to ensure Venezuela's sovereignty over its aquatic space and any oil interests that may be included
within that territory.' 7 9 Moreover, ChAvez enacted several decrees providing Venezuelan citizens better housing opportunities, 18 0 ensuring them
access to basic necessities and public resources,' 8 ' and protecting consumers from dangerous, black-market, and adulterated products.182
Unlike the 2000 enabling law, however, the number of controversial
decrees enacted under the 2007 enabling law was proportionately higher.
Although ChAvez' 2007 constitutional referendum failed, ChAvez used
the enabling law to push several of the proposed reforms through as
law.18 3 Twenty-six of Chdvez' sixty-seven decrees, including more than a
dozen that were similar to amendments of the failed 2007 constitutional
173. Id.
174. See Corrales & Penfold-Becerra, supra note 171, at 110; see also AILLAN BI-uwi-i
CARIAS, DISMANTILING DEMOCRACY IN VENEZUELA: A CHAVEZ AunHoRrrARIAN EXPERIMrNT 73 (2010).
175. See BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 174, at 73.
176. Suggett, supra note 163.

177. See Context Paper: Towards a Bolivarian Social Economy, EMBASSY OF THE
BOLVARIAN REP. OF VENEZ. TO THE U.S. (Sept. 2008), http://venezuela-us.org/
live/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/CPTowards-a-Bolivarian-Social-EconomySep23.
pdf.
178. See Decreto No. 6.070, Titulo VI, de 5 de Junio de 2008, GACETA OFICIAL D)E LA
REPUBLICA BOUIVARIANA DE VENEZUEL7 A, No. 38.946, de 5 de Junio de 2008,

availableat http://www.tsj.gov.ve/gaceta/junio/050608/050608-38946-6.html.
179. See Decreto No. 6.126, de 3 de Junio de 2008, GACEIA OFICIAI)-E l.A REPunLICA
BoL-IVARIANA DE VENHZUE-LA, No. 5.890, de 31 de Julio de 2008, available at http:/

/media.noticias24.com/0808/gac5890.pdf.
180. Decreto No. 6.072, de 14 de Mayo de 2008, GACHTA OFICIAL DE LA REPUBLICA
Boi iVARIANA DE VENEZUELA, No. 5889, de 31 de Julio de 2008, availableat http://

media.noticias24.com/0808/gac5889.pdf.
181. See generally id. (access to housing); Decreto 6.092, de 27 de Mayo de 2008,
GACETA OFICIAL DE LA RE-PunLICA BOIUVARIANA DE VENEZUELA, No. 5889, de
31 de Julio de 2008, available at http://media.noticias24.com/0808/gac5889.pdf (access to goods and services); Decreto 6.071, 14 de Mayo de 2008, GACETA OFICIAl
DE LA REPUBLICA BOLIVAMIANA DE VENE.UELA, No. 5.889, de 31 de Jhlio de
2008, available at http://media.noticias24.com/0808/gac5889.pdf (access to food).

182. Decreto 6.092, Arts. 142, 145-45.
183. Jose Orozco & Sara M. Llana, Venezuela's Chavez Riles Critics With New Decree,
CI1RISTIAN Sc. MONrroR, Aug. 12,2008, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2008/0812/p04s01-woam.html (as Maryclen Stelling said, "Chavez had a Plan A

and a Plan B. Approving the Constitutional reforms through a vote-the revolu-
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reform, were enacted immediately before the enabling law expired in August 2008.184 The Venezuelan government, additionally, did not release
the full text of the decrees until nearly a week after they were promulgated.185 Chdvez' opposition claimed that Chivez' promulgation of these
decrees was in direct conflict with the 2007 constitutional referendum and
the will of the people. 186 Chivez brushed aside such complaints, arguing
that the decrees were lawfully promulgated under the Constitution, and
that none of the decrees unlawfully modified any constitutional
amendments.1 87
The decrees that were the most published, and possibly the most controversial, were Chavez' decrees nationalizing industries. Under the enabling law, ChAvez nationalized: (1) the iron and steel industries in the
region of Guayana; 8 8 (2) all private oil companies in the oil-rich Orinoco
region;' 89 and (3) all large, private cement companies.190 The decrees
required that these privately-owned companies become mixed public-private companies with the state owning, at a minimum, sixty percent of the
company.191 Chavez also issued several decrees that provided the framework for future nationalizations in the energy, railroad, and banking industries. 192 Currently, however, it is unclear whether Chivez will have to
tion using democratic channels-represented Plan A, and the enabling law was
Plan B.").
184. Simon Romero, New Decrees From Chavez MirrorSpurned Measures, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 5, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/06/world/americas/06venez.html?
r=2&ref=World; see also Ian James, Loss Not All Bad For Venezuela's Chavez,
HACER, http://www.hacer.org/current/Vene211.php (last visited Oct. 31, 2010).
185. Romero, supra note 184.
186. Id.
187. Context Paper: Laws Approved Via the Enabling Law, EMBASSY OF THIii
BOLIVARIAN REP. OF VENEZ. -1-OTHE U.S. (Aug. 2008), http://venezuela-us.org/

live/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/CPRecentLawsAprovedEnablingLaw-Aug-20081.
pdf.
188. Decreto 6.058, de 30 de Abril de 2008, GACETA OFICIAL DE LA REPUBLICA
BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA, No. 38.928, de 12 de Mayo de 2008, available at

http://www.tsj.gov.ve/gaceta/mayo/120508/120508-38928-5.html.
189.

Decreto 5.200, de 26 de Febrero de 2007, GACETA OFICIAL DE LA REPUBLICA
BoLVARIANA DE VENEZUIELA, No. 38.632, de 26 de Febrero de 2007, available at

http://www.tsj.gov.ve/gaceta/febrero/260207/260207-38632-03.html.
190. Decreto 6.091, de 27 de Mayo de 2008, GACETA OFICIAL DE LA RiEiU.ICA
Boi-IVARIANA DE VENEZUELA, No. 5.889, de 18 de Junio de 2008, available at

http://www.tsj.gov.ve/gaceta-ext/junio/180608/180608-5886-1.html.
191.

Decreto No. 6.091, Art. 2, de 27 de Mayo de 2008, GACETA OFICIAL DE LA RiPunLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA, 5.886, de 18 de Junio de 2008 available at

http://www.tsj.gov.ve/gaceta-ext/junio/180608/180608-5886-2.html

(cement compa-

nies); Decreto No. 6.058, Art. 2, de 30 de Abril de 2008, GACETA OFICIAL DE LA
REPUBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA, 38.928, de 12 de Mayo de 2008 availa-

ble at http://www.tsj.gov.ve/gaceta/mayo/120508/120508-38928-5.html (Guyana
steel industries); Decreto No. 5.200, Art. 2,de 26 de Febrero de 2007, GACETA
OFICIAL DE LA REPUnLICA BOLIVARIANA D)E VENEZUELA, 38.362, de 26 de
Febrero de 2007 available at http://www.tsj.gov.ve/gaceta/febrero/260207/26020738632-03.html (Orinoco oil companies).
192. Decreto No. 5.330, Art. 7, de 2 de Mayo de 2007, GACETA OFICIAL D3ELA Ri-I'unLICA BOI-IVARIANA DE VENEZUELA, 38.736, de 31 de Julio de 2007, available at

(energy); Venehttp://www.tsj.gov.ve/gaceta/julio/310707/310707-38736-06.htmi
zuela's Chavez Decrees Reform to Banking Law, REu-Es, Aug. 1, 2008, http://
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wait for another enabling law to nationalize such industries, or if he can
use the "gray" area of his constitutional decree authority to nationalize
them when he sees fit.
Chivez additionally issued several decrees increasing the Executive's
military strength. In his Law of the Bolivarian National Army, Chivez
created the Bolivarian National Militia, which exists in addition to Venezuela's Army, Navy, Air Force, and National Guard. 193 Like the other
arms of the military, the National Militia is under the control of the President.194 The National Militia's duties are similar to the other armed
forces in that the National Militia fights during a time of war, preserves
internal peace, and assists in a time of emergency.1 95 The biggest difference between the National Militia and the other military branches, however, is that the militia consists of all citizens who voluntarily organize to
help defend the nation. 196 Because this definition was left intentionally
broad, several questions arise regarding the National Militia. For example, are Chivez' supporters who, acting in the name of ChAvez and Venezuela, engage in violence against opposition forces provided protection
since they may be acting under the guise of "national defense?" These
questions remain to be answered, but it appears that the militia's role in
controlling the Venezuelan population may be increasing.' 97
Although ChAvez enacted decrees that provided consumers with
greater protection, those same decrees undermined the rights of workers
and business owners. For example, the decrees that ensured Venezuelan
citizens access to basic services, food supplies, and goods also criminalized many actions that were once legal.1 98 Following the precedent established in the 1993 and 1994 enabling laws, these decrees created new
felonies for individuals who boycott, or refuse to sell or produce, or impede-directly or indirectly-the production and transportation of goods
uk.reuters.com/article/idUKN126901820080801 (banking); see Decreto No. 6.069,
Art. 13, de 14 de Mayo de 2008, GACETA OFICIAL DE LA REPuInLICA BoiAVARIANA DE VENEZUELA, No. 5.889, de 31 de Julio de 2008, available at http://media.noticias24.com/0808/gac5889.pdf (railroads).
193. Decreto No. 6.239, de 22 de Julio de 2008, GACETA OFICIAL DE LA REPuBIACA
Boi-iVARIANA DE VENEZUFLA, 5.891, de 31 de Julio de 2008, available at http://

media.noticias24.com/0808/gac5891.pdf; Fact Sheet: Organic Law of the Bolivarian
Armed Force, EMBASSY OF TFHE BOLIVARIAN Rev. OF VENEZ. TO THIE U.S. (Aug.

194.
195.
196.
197.

2008), http://venezuela-us.org/live/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/FS-FANB-LawOct-20081.pdf.
Fact Sheet: Organic Law of the Bolivarian Armed Force, supra note 193.
Id.
Id.
See Ian James, Chavez: Civilian Militia Should be Armed Full-Time, YAHOO NEWS,
Oct. 3, 2010, http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20101003/apon-rela_amca/It_
venezuela chavez 3.

198. See Decreto 6.092, de 27 de Mayo de 2008, GACETA OFICIAL DE LA REPUBLICA

BouIVARIANA DE VENEZUPLA, No. 5889, de 31 de Julio de 2008, available at http://
media.noticias24.com/0808/gac5889.pdf (goods and services); Decreto No. 5.197,
Capitulo 5, de 16 de Febrero de 2007, GACETA OFICIAL DE LA REPUBLICA

BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA, No. 39.629, de 21 de Febrero de 2007, available at
http://www.tsj.gov.ve/gaceta/febrero/210207/210207-38629-05.html

(food).
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that are deemed "basic" or under price controls. 199 Violations of these
decrees may result in fines, seizure of goods or companies, temporary
closings, or imprisonment for up to ten years. 200
These decrees are problematic for several reasons. First, the decrees
appear to be an attack on Chivez' labor opposition. By criminalizing
actions that impede the production and transportation of necessary
goods, the decrees essentially deny organized labor its right to strike.20 1
Moreover, the decrees undermine the property rights of business owners
because unprofitable businesses would still have to operate at a loss or
face confiscation and/or prison. 202 Thus, while these decrees benefit consumers, they come at the cost of rights for other groups.
Another controversial decree was Chavez' "Law of Public Administration." The law created regional political leaders, directly appointed by
the President, who possess national budgets separate from those given to
regional governments. 203 Through this law, Chivez can create alternative
governments in regions where ChAvez' opposition is in control. Moreover, because the budget of these regional leaders is left intentionally
vague, Chivez can pump oil-cash into these regional leaders who can distribute the money to ensure political patronage.
Additionally, Chivez enacted several decrees that were viewed as controversial because they further cemented "21st Century Socialism" in
Venezuela. 204 For example, Chivez created the National Institute for Socialist Education and Training, issued a decree providing barter as an official alternative payment system to currency, 205 and promulgated the
"Law for the Creation and Development of the Popular Economy" which
created production, distribution, and consumption "brigades" to encourage the "socio-productive" economy. 206 While these decrees may
not have much impact in the overall function of society, the decrees' emphasis on socialism is controversial as they help transform Chdvez' ideal
of socialism into the nation's status quo, which can only be changed
through future action by opposition leaders.
199. Decreto No. 5.197, Art. 24, de 16 de Febrero de 2007, GACET[A OFIAL DE LA
REPUBLUCA BOuIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA, No. 38.629, de 21 de Febrero de 2007,

available at http://www.tsj.gov.ve/gaceta/febrero/210207/210207-38629-05.html.
200. Id.
201. See Context Paper: Laws Approved Via the Enabling Law, supra note 187 (a strike
is cited as an example of activity that would be in violation of the law).
202. See generally, Venezuela Law May Impact Property Rights, OSAC, Mar. 8, 2007,
http://www.osac.gov/Reports/report.cfm?contentlD=64515.
203. Decreto No. 6.217, de 23 de Julio de 2008, GACETA OFIGIAL EXTRAORDINARIO

LA REPUBLICA BOLIVARIANA Di, VENEZUELA, No. 5.890, de 31 de Julio de
2008, available at http://media.noticias24.com/0808/gac5890.pdf.
204. Suggett, supra note 163.
205. Decreto No. 6.068, GACEIA OFICIAL DE LA RiEPUBLICA BOLIVARIANA Die VIHNIE
ZUELA, No. 38.958, de 23 de Junio de 2008, available at http://www.tsj.gov.ve/
gaceta/junio230608/230608-38958-16.html.
Di-

206. Decreto No. 6.130, de 23 de Julio de 2008, GACETA OFICIAL EXTRAORDINARIO
Die LA REPUBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA, No. 5.890, de 31 de Julio de

2008, available at http://media.noticias24.com/0808/gac5890.pdf.
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It is important to note that not all of ChAvez' controversial decrees
were successful. In May 2008, Chivez issued an extremely controversial
decree modifying the "National Intelligence and Counterintelligence
Law." 2 0 7 The law, described as a tool to protect the country from a U.S.
invasion, required that all citizens cooperate with police investigations or
be subject to jail time. 2 0 8 The law also authorized warrantless searches
when they were done in the interest of national security, and created
neighborhood leaders who actively sought to find incriminating information about their neighbors. 2 0 9 Both Chivez' supporters and opponents
challenged the law, arguing that ChAvez was creating a police state similar
to that in Cuba.2 10 Due to the unpopularity of the decree, Chivez revised
the law in June 2008 to remove the most controversial aspects of it.211
Studying 2007's enabling law, we can see that ChAvez' decrees were far
more controversial than many of the decrees in prior enabling laws. First,
ChAvez nationalized many of the nation's key industries and created the
framework for the future nationalization of other industries. Second,
Chavez issued decrees that greatly changed the legal obligations of many
individuals within society, particularly union workers and business owners. Finally, and most importantly, ChAvez used the 2007 enabling law to
further consolidate power around the Executive. By creating the National Militia, Chivez has equipped himself with the manpower to quell
opposition protests. Furthermore, by establishing alternative regional
political leaders, Chdvez has provided himself a legal framework to undermine opposition leaders.
iii. Comparing The Two Eras
In comparing the two eras above, it is clear that Venezuelan DDA,
under the enabling law, has been used much more frequently under Chdvez than during any previous presidency. From 1961 to 1998, the enabling
law was granted five times. 2 1 2 During ChAvez' presidency, however, the
enabling law has been granted three times. It is also apparent that the
balance of the Executive-Legislative interplay has switched from the Legislature to the Executive, with ChAvez controlling both the scope and
length of any enabling law. Moreover, Venezuela's Legislature no longer
provides specific details regarding their DDA grants. Instead, the details
have been left intentionally vague to provide ChAvez the most generous
207. Decreto No.6.067,

GACETA OFICIAL DE LA REPUBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA, No. 28.940, de 28 de Mayo de 2008, available at http://www.tsj.gov.ve/

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

gaceta/mayo280508/280508-38940-2.html; Chris Kraul, Chdvez Facing Pressure,
Will Revoke Venezuela Spying Law, L.A. TIMES, June 9, 2008, http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jun/09/world/fg-chavez9.
Kraul, supra note 207, at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1; Decreto No. 6.156, GACETA OFICIAI., DE LA REPUBLICA BOLIVARIANA
DE VENEZUELA, No. 38.949, de 10 de Junio de 2008, available at http://
www.tsj.gov.ve/gaceta/junio/100608/100608-38949-23.html.
Crisp, supra note 3, at 146.
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amount of deference. Finally, the system of oversight by the Legislature
is no longer rigorous. The fact that Chdvez refused for a week to give the
exact language of his twenty-six last-minute decrees in 2008 reveals that
there is little, if any, Legislative oversight of the ChAvez' DDA power.
ChAvez, however, has followed precedent established in one area of the
1993 and 1994 enabling laws by using the enabling laws to change the
country's criminal code. The difference between the two eras, however,
is that ChAvez has gone far beyond precedent by modifying the criminal
code to include a broad range of criminal offenses that could have longlasting effects on the nation's labor laws, property laws, and economic
rights of individuals.
Figure 3, below, provides a visual comparison of all of the enabling
laws granted since Venezuela's 1961 Constitution. I use four criteria in
comparing the two eras: (1) length of DDA grant; (2) scope of the grant;
(3) number of decrees issued during the grant; and (4) the number of
controversial decrees. The analysis of controversial decrees is largely a
subjective one, however it is not used to determine whether the decrees
are good or bad and merely applies to decrees that were controversial in
nature or substantially altered the pre-existing economic, social, or legal
conditions of Venezuela.
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Figure 3
Num. of
Length of
Enabling Law

Scope of Enabling Law

Num. Decrees
Enacted

Controversial
Decrees
0

1961

12 Months

Economic and Finance

15213

1974

12 Months

Economic and Finance

53214

1984

12 Months

Economic and Finance

71215

0

1993

4 Months

Economic and Finance

13216

1

1994

1 Month

Economic and Finance

4217

0

1999

6 Months

Economic and Finance

54218

0

2000

12 Months

Finance
Economy and Society
Infrastructure
Personal and Legal Security
Science and Technology
Civil Service

49219

4

2007

18 Months

Energy
InfTastructure, Transport, and Services
Transformation of the State
Economic and Social Affairs
Finances and Taxation
Grassroots participation
The Exercise of Public Office
Citizen and Judicial Security
Territorial Order
Security and Defense
Science and Technology
Land-use Planning

67220

18

Time-Length of the Enabling Law: The data shows that Chdvez has
lengthened the time-length of DDA in Venezuela from twelve months to
eighteen month-a quarter of Chivez' current term. Moreover, the data
shows that Chdvez has enjoyed DDA powers for three of the ten years he
has been president-over one-fourth of his presidency. Alternatively, in
the thirty-eight years prior to Chivez, the Executives enjoyed DDA powers for a combined total of three years, five months.
213. Francisco Monaldi, Political Institutions. Policymaking Processes, and Policy
Outcomes in Venezuela, LATIN AMERICAN R~siSA~tcii NETWORK, http://
www.iadb.org/res/laresnetwork/projects/pr231finaldraft.pdf (last visited Jan. 12,
2011).
214. Id. at 16.
215. Thirty-six of the seventy-one decrees were used for the purpose of selling
government bonds to refitance the public debt. Crisp, supra note 3, at 149.
216. Id. at 150.
217. Id. at 151.
218. Id.
219. Venezuela: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, U.S.9 DEP'T OF STATE,
Mar. 4, 2002, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/wha/822 .htm.
220. Democracy and Human Rights in Venezuela, supra note 131, 91327.
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Scope of the Enabling Law: The data shows that the scope of enabling
laws has dramatically increased under the ChAvez presidency. Although
Chivez' last two enabling laws contained a much larger scope than the
prior six enabling laws, it is necessary to note that the first six enabling
laws were constitutionally limited to economic and financial matters. As
a result, Venezuela's Legislature could not extend DDA powers in areas
outside of economic and financial matters. Nonetheless, Chivez has obtained continuously broader enabling laws since the 1999 Constitution.
In fact, Chivez 2007 enabling law doubled the 2000 enabling law in the
amount of areas permitted. Even though the overall scope of the 2000
and 2007 enabling laws might be the same, the mere fact that the 2007
enabling law contained twelve distinct areas signifies that ChAvez had the
authority to enact decrees in any possible area, thereby making it much
more difficult to challenge ChAvez' decree authority.
Number of Decrees Issued: When compared to any one grant of the
enabling law, Chivez has not issued the largest number of decrees. 22 1
Even though Chivez did not issue the most decrees during any one enabling law, the total number of decrees Chivez issued during his presidency is more than the total number of decrees issued by his predecessors
combined. Whereas ChAvez' has issued 170 decrees under enabling laws,
Chivez' predecessors issued only 156 decrees combined. 2 2 2 Based on
these numbers, it is clear that not only has Chivez been more prolific in
obtaining DDA powers, but he has also been prolific in issuing decrees
under his DDA powers. Moreover, considering ChAvez has enjoyed
DDA powers five months less than all prior Executives, ChAvez' decree
rate is substantially higher than those of his predecessors.
Furthermore, through the use of DDA, Chivez has become the nation's leading legislator. During the 2007 and 2008 enabling law, Chivez
issued sixty-seven decrees into law. 2 2 3 At the same time, Venezuela's
Legislature approved only twenty-five laws. 2 2 4 Thus, seventy-three percent of all laws passed during the 2007 enabling law were drafted by
ChAvez.
Number of ControversialDecrees: As previously mentioned, this criterion is a subjective element measuring the content of the decrees. Thus,
the following figures apply to those decrees that were controversial in
nature or substantially altered the pre-existing economic, social, or legal
conditions of Venezuela. Examples of such decrees include the nationalizing or privatizing of industries, the changing of the criminal code, and
the altering of legal rights and obligations of the nation's citizens. Moreover, this criterion also applies to decrees that altered the federal government to consolidate power within the Executive branch or undermine the
221. It is, however, important to note that during the 1984 enabling law, thirty-six of the
seventy-one decrees were for the sole purpose of selling government bonds to
restructure the country's public debt. Crisp, supra note 3, at 149.
222. See fig. 3.
223. Democracy and Human Rights in Venezuela, supra note 131, 1 327.
224. Id.
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power of opposition parties. Finally, this criterion applies to ideological
changes made through decrees. Although these decrees may not have a
practical impact, the ideological make-up of the federal government is an
essential component of the government's overall policy and shapes the
nation's status quo.
Based on the subjective analysis, it is clear that ChAvez, unlike his
predecessors, has used the enabling law in a much more controversial
manner. In the 1961, 1984, 1994, and 1999 enabling laws, the Executives
did not promulgate any controversial decrees. Under the 1974 enabling
law, the Executive issued one controversial decree, which nationalized
the country's iron ore industry. 225 Moreover, the 1993 enabling law had
one controversial decree when he privatized the national airline. 2 2 6
Since the 1999 Constitution, ChAvez issued four controversial decrees
under the 2000 enabling law and eighteen controversial decrees under the
2007 enabling law. What is important to note about this trend is that
Chivez used his DDA powers to parallel, or even substitute constitutional change. Because ChAvez' 2007 Constitutional Referendum failed,
Chavez used his DDA powers to make several broad changes that had
previously been denied under the referendum. Essentially, Chivez used
his DDA powers as a "back-up" plan to the failed referendum, thereby
ensuring that he was going to bring these controversial changes regardless
of the national vote. 2 2 7 Furthermore, it appears that Chivez enacted decrees designed to protect himself and his movement from future political,
economic, and social unrest by allowing him to take immediate action
against any opposition challenging his authority.
Overall, the figures show that ChAvez' use of DDA powers has increased dramatically when compared to his predecessors. Chdvez has
lengthened the time-grant of the enabling law, enjoyed DDA powers
more than any prior president, issued more decrees than all prior presidents combined, enjoyed a substantially broader scope of DDA authority,
and issued far more controversial decrees than any prior president.
Based on this trend of obtaining continuously broader grants of DDA, it
seems clear that ChAvez will continue to obtain powers under the enabling law and seek to further broaden those powers to include a longer
time-length and even broader, if possible, scope of powers.

B.

ECUADOR 228

As was previously discussed, Ecuador provides its Executive post-ap225. Crisp, supra note 3, at 147.
226. While some may argue that privatizing national industries is not as controversial as
nationalizing industries, the effects are significant and both cases must be included
in the analysis. See Crisp, supra note 3, at 149-51.
227. See Jose Orozco & Sara Llana, Venezuela's Chdvez Riles Critics With New Decree,
CHRISIAN SC. MONrrou, Aug 12, 2008, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2008/0812/p04s01-woam.html.
228. The following information on Ecuador is accurate as of Oct. 15, 2010. I must note
that the accuracy of the data is limited to the accuracy of the data available on
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proval DDA. 229 Ecuador's post-approval DDA is limited, however, as
the Executive can only send one proyecto urgente at a time, and the scope
of the proyectos urgentes are limited to economic matters. 230 Moreover,
since the Legislature has up to thirty days to act upon the proyecto
urgente, the amount of proyecto urgentes an Executive can send in one
year is effectively limited to twelve. 23 1 Consequently, the use of DDA in
Ecuador is inherently less than is seen in Venezuela.
The following analysis of the Executives' use of post-approval powers
in Ecuador focuses on the differences between the pre-Rafael Correa era
and the Correa era. This section will determine if, and to what extent,
Correa's use of post-approval has differed from his predecessors Gustavo
Noboa, Lucio Gutierrez, and Alfred Palacio.
1. Pre-CorreaEra232
a.

Gustavo Noboa Presidency

Gustavo Noboa's presidency lasted from January 20, 2000 to January
15, 2003.233 During this period, Noboa sent twelve proyectos urgentes to
the Ecuador's National Assembly. 234 The proyectos urgentes created a
"petroleum fund" to help pay off state debt and increase investment in
the oil sector, 235 restructured the financial system, 236 provided tax cred238 Noboa also
its,237 and increased foreign investment in the oil industry.
sent several proyectos urgentes that merely renewed prior laws that were
on the verge of expiring. None of Noboa's proyectos urgentes were controversial in nature.

229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Ecuador's online version of the Registro Oficial, http://www.derechoecuador.
Despite any
com/index.php?option=com-content&task=view&id=2&Itemid=11.
problems with the online database, I believe that the following analysis is accurate
and provides a true depiction of DDA in Ecuador.
REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR CONsTITrUTION oF 1998 art. 155.
Id.
Id.
Although an analysis of the entire period after the 1998 Constitution would have
been optimal, information regarding proyectos urgentes before 2000 is not readily
available. Accordingly, the analysis includes only 2000 to the present.
Biografias Lideres Politicos: Gustavo Noboa Bejarano, CIDOB (2003) http://
www.cidob.org/es/documentacio/biografias_1ideres-politicos/americadel sur/ecuador/gustavonoboa-bejarano (last visited Jan. 18, 2011).
See Registro Oficial, supra note 228.
Se Aprob6 La Reforma Fiscal Con Cambios [Fiscal Reform was Passed with
Changes], Ei. COMIRCio, Apr. 26, 2002, http://www.elcomercio.com/solo texto_
search.asp?idnoticia=22504&anio=2002&mes=4&dia=26.
La Deuda Extern Tiene Un Limite [External Debt has a Limit], Er COMERCIO,
Sept. 12, 2002, http://www.elcomercio.com/solo-textosearch.asp?id-noticia=3718
5&anio=2002&mes=9&dia=12.
El Malec6n 2000 Con Mds Beneficios [The Malec6n 2000 With More Benefits], Et
COMERCIO, Oct. 5, 2001,
http://www.elcomercio.com/solo-texto search.asp?id.
noticia=2345&anio=20 0 1&mes=10&dia=5.
Registro Oficial 31 De Octubre Del 2002-Proyecto 23-918, REVISTA JUDICIAL, Oct.
31, 2002, availableat http://www.derechoecuador.com/index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=1562&Itemid=308.
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Noboa did not face much resistance from the National Assembly regarding his proyectos urgentes as the National Assembly rejected only
one of them. 239 The National Assembly rejected Noboa's proyecto
urgente involving the income of public employees. 240 Rather than face
the issue through a proyecto urgente, the National Assembly wanted the
law to be sent through ordinary means by incoming President Lucio
Gutierrez. 241
b.

Lucio Gutierrez Presidency

Lucio Gutierrez' presidency lasted from January 2003 to April 2005.242
Gutierrez sent ten proyectos urgentes during his presidency. 243 Gutierrez'
proyectos urgentes restructured the public sector to reduce nepotism, created a unified public employment income standard, and increased government efficiency. 244 Gutierrez also sent a proyecto urgente increasing
taxes on cigarettes and liquor to help pay for pensions. 245 Moreover,
shortly before the end of his presidency, Gutierrez sent a broad proyecto
urgente intended to reform many aspects of the country's economic sector.2 4 6 This proyecto urgente sought to modernize the nation's economy
by increasing foreign investment in the oil sector, lowering energy costs,
and improving the operation of Social Security. 2 4 7 While Gutierrez'
proyectos urgentes may have been broad in nature, none of those mentioned above were controversial. Instead, they were viewed as measures
necessary to address issues that prior administrations had ignored.
Although the National Assembly approved many of Gutierrez'
proyectos urgentes, it rejected, perhaps, two of Gutierrez' most important
239. While it would have been best to have looked at how drastically the National Assembly modified individual proyectos urgentes, such data is not readily available.
Thus, the most that could be considered was whether the National Assembly rejected or accepted the Executives' proyectos urgentes.
240. El Pleno Niega El Proyecto Urgente [The plenary Denies Urgent Project], El- CoM[Rcjo, Dec. 12, 2002, http://www.elcomercio.com/solo-textosearch.aspidnoticia=46250&anio=2002&mes=12&dia=1 1.
241. Id.
242. Biograffas Lideres Politicos: Lucio Gutidrrez Borbfia, CIDOB (2006), http://www.
cidob.org/es/documentacion/biografias liderespoliticos/america del sur/ecuador/
lucio-gutierrez borbua (last visited Jan. 18, 2011).
243. See Registro Oficial, supra note 228.
244. PioyECro. LA INICIATIVA QUE LLEGO AYER Al CONGRESO FUA UN TECHO A LAS
INDEMNIZACIONES: LA UNIFICACION SALARIAL SE CUMPIE [The initiative that
came to Congress yesterday sets a ceiling on compensation: It Marks The Unification of Salaries], Ei. COMFRCIO, JUNE 14, 2003, http://www.elcomercio.com/solo
texto search.asp?idnoticia=64063&anio=2003&mes=6&dia=14;

LA REFORMA A

LA LiEY DE SERVICIO CIVIL A ESTUDIO [Reform of the Civil Service Act Studied],
El COMERCIO, DEc. 23, 2003, http://www.elcomercio.com/solo-texto-search.asp?

idnoticia=81876&anio=2003&mes=1 2&dia=23.
245. Registro Oficial-Proyecto 25.394, REVIS-TA

JUDICIAL,

http://www.derechoecuador.com/index.php?option=com

July 28, 2004, available at
content&task=view&id=

11 12&Itemid=329.
246. Gobierno Del Ecuador Impulsa Reforma Econ6mica Integral [Government of Ecuador

Promotes

AGENCY-SPANISH,

247. Id.

Comprehensive
Mar. 16, 2005.

Economic

Reform],

XINHUA

NEWS
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ones. First, the National Assembly rejected Gutierrez' proyecto urgente
restructuring of the oil industry. It sought to encourage foreign investment in the oil industry by reducing the percentage PetroEcuador, Ecuador's national oil company, would take from profits of new oil extractions
to thirty-five percent. 248 In essence, this proyecto urgente was an attempt
by Gutierrez to force the National Assembly to deal with the inefficiencies of PetroEcuador and the oil industry-something the National Assembly had refused to do. Second, the National Assembly rejected
Gutierrez' proyecto urgente that would have issued government bonds to
invest in a new generation of hydro-electric energy. 24 9 Once again, this
proyecto urgente sought to encourage private investment in the energy
sector by prioritizing payment to private companies over state companies.
The National Assembly thought it unpopular and rejected it.
c.

Alfredo Palacio Presidency

Alfredo Palacio was President of Ecuador from April 2005 to January
During his fifteen-month presidency, he sent eight proyectos
urgentes to the National Assembly. 251 Palacio's proyectos urgentes created a uniform credit verifying system, 2 5 2 redistributed the funds of the
Stabilization, Social Investment, and Reduction of Public Debt Fund, 253
re-approved tax credits, 2 5 4 and enabled the Central Bank to obtain loans
to pay the country's balance of payment problems. 255
The remainder of Palacio's proyectos urgentes involved the country's
energy sector. Palacio sent proyectos urgentes recognizing the inefficiency of the country's energy companies and the need to invest in infrastructure to reduce future losses,25 6 calling for contract renegotiations

2007.250

248.

LAS REFORMAS PETROLERAS EN UNA ETAPA DECISIVE [O1 REFORMS IN A DiEcIsIvE STAGE], Ej- COMERCIO, JUNE 28, 2004, http://www.elcomercio.com/solo

textosearch.asp?idnoticia=97374&anio=2004&mes=6&dia=28.
249. La Ley Eldctricafue rechazada [The Electricity Law was Rejectedl, Et COMRcO,
Sept. 22, 2004, http://www.elcomercio.com/solo-textosearch.asp?id .noticia=1045
88&anio=2004&mes=9&dia=22.
250. Alfredo Palacio,MUNDOANDINO, 2009, http://www.mundoandino.com/ecuador/al-

fredo-palacio.
251. Id.
12
252. Registro Oficial-Proyecto 26.810, Riev]sTA JUDICIAL, Sept. , 2005, available at
http://www.derechoecuador.com/index.php?option=com-content&task=view&id=
1363&Itemid=343.
253. Et LAVADO DE Acrlvos ENTRARA A DEBATE [MONEY LAUNDERING ENTERS THE
DEBATE], Et COMERCIO, JUNE 14, 2005, http://www.elcomercio.com/solo-texto_
search.asp?idnoticia=1 31958&anio=2005&mes=6&dia=1 4.

254.

LAS DONACIONES A FAVOR DEL MUNICIO SERAN INDEFINIDAS [DONATIONS FOR
THE MUNICIPALITY WuIL BE INDEFINITE], Et COMERcio, DEc. 1, 2006, http://
www.elcomercio.com/solo-texto-search.asp?id-noticia=50960&anio=2006&mes=

12&dia=1.
255. Un Proyecto Urgente para ContratarCriditos [Urgent Project for Hiring Credits],
Et COMEiCio, Oct. 7, 2005, http://www.elcomercio.com/solo-texto-search.asp?idnoticia=3562&anio=2005&mes=10&dia=7.
256. Registro Oficial-Proyecto 27-1194, RIvisTA JUDICIAL, July 14, 2006, available at

http://www.derechoecuador.com/index.php?option=com-content&task=view&id=
2031&Itemid=353.
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with foreign companies, 257 and creating a fund for investment into the
energy sector. 258 Unlike his predecessors, Palacio's proyectos urgentes
were not rejected by the National Assembly.
d.

Characteristics of the Pre-Correa Era

The pre-Correa era has several characteristics regarding the use of the
country's post-approval DDA powers. First, the use of post-approval
DDA powers was quite limited. None of the Executives attempted to
inundate the National Assembly with proyectos urgentes. Noboa sent
only twelve proyectos in thirty-six months, Gutierrez sent ten proyectos in
twenty-seven months, and Palacio sent eight proyectos in fifteen months.
Second, Noboa, Gutierrez, and Palacio's proyectos urgentes, constitutionally limited to economic and financial areas, focused largely on increasing
foreign investment and reducing costs of the nation's public oil and energy sectors. Finally, the National Assembly did not hesitate to reject the
Executives' proyectos urgentes. Although they rejected only a small percentage of the proyectos urgentes-one during the Noboa administration
and two during the Gutierrez administration-the rejections show that
the Executive-Legislative interplay was quite active and balanced, and
that the Legislature limited the amount of change an Executive could
undertake in any one proyecto urgente.
2.

Correa Era

Rafael Correa became Ecuador's president on January 15, 2007.259
Prior to the 2008 Constitution, Correa sent four proyectos urgentes to the
National Assembly. Those proyectos urgentes increased taxes to improve
Quito's transportation infrastructure, 260 financed $220 million for education, 261 and limited the maximum interest rate on consumer credit. 2 6 2
257. El Midrcoles se Debate la Ley de Hidrocarburos[They Will Debate the Hydrocarbons

Law

on

Wednesday],

Ei

COMRCIo,

Apr.

6,

2006,

http://www.

elcomercio.com/Generales/Solo-Texto.aspx?gn3articlelD=42186.
258. El Proyecto de Ley Urgente es la Prioridaddel Congreso [The Urgent Project Bill is
Congress' Priority], Et

ComEizcio, Sept. 5, 2006, http://www.elcomercio.com/

Generales/Solo-Texto.aspx?gn3articlelD=58575.
259. Ecuador Politics: Crisis Overcome, Risks Linger, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE

UNrI, Oct. 1, 2010, http://www.eiu.com/index.asp?layout=VWArticleVW3&articleid=397476624&region-id=&country-id=1790000179&refm=vwCtry&page-title=Latest+analysis&fs=true. Even though Correa sent proyectos urgentes to the
National Assembly before and after the 2008 Constitution, it is not necessary to
formally distinguish the two areas since the 2008 Constitution did not substantially
change Ecuador's DDA. Id.
260. Registro Oficial-Proyecto28-004, REVISTA JUDICIAL, February 2, 2007, availableat

http://www.derechoecuador.comlindex.php?option=Comcontent&task=view&
id=4488&Itemid=360.
261. Marco Arauz Ortega, BUENA EDUCACON, ,Y poi QuP No? [A Gooi EDUCATION, AND WHY NoT?], EL- COMERCIO, Feb. 11, 2007, http://www.contrato
socialecuador.org.ec/home/contenidos.php?id=43&identificaArticulo=274.
262. SEGON El SOPER DEr BANCOS, LA LEY FINANCIERA ES RIESGOSA [According to the
Head of the Banks, the FinanceAct is Hazardous], EL CoMECIO, MAY 23, 2007,

http://www.elcomercio.com/solo-texto-search.asp?id-noticia=73507&anio=2007&
mes=5&dia=23.
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Correa also sent a proyecto urgente modifying the country's Hydrocarbons Law. It sought to combat the black-market sale of oil and its byproducts. 2 6 3 This proyecto urgente is significant in that it proposed
altering the criminal code to increase criminal sanctions, including fines
and jail time for individuals who violate the law. 2 64 This appears to have
been the first instance an Executive sent a proyecto urgente involving
criminal measures.
Since the 2008 Constitutional Referendum, Correa has sent six additional proyectos urgentes to the National Assembly to push through his
"Citizens' Revolution." Several of these proyectos urgentes were largely
uncontroversial and included placing a one percent tax on currency leaving the country to combat capital flight, 26 5 suspending fines for Haitian
tourists whose visas had expired due to Haiti's January 2010 earthquake, 266 revaluing the country's retirement pension system, 267 and
promulgating a new public finance law to increase the government's access to debt-financing.268
Since 2009, Correa has faced stiff resistance from his opposition in the
National Assembly. A unifying opposition has denied Correa and his
party, Alianza Pais (AP), the majority needed to pass key pieces of legislation through normal legislative channels.2 69 As a result, several of Correa's key pieces of legislation that were intended to coordinate with the
constitutional reform have been stalled or substantially changed by a
deadlocked National Assembly.270 Due to Correa's inability to pass leg263. Correa Submits Anti-smuggling Bill to Congress, Bus. NEws AM., May 30, 2007,
http://www.bnamericas.com/news/oilandgas/Correa-submits-anti-smuggling-bill
tocongress.
264. Id.
265. Se Tratard Proyecto de Ley Urgente de Reformas Tributarias Ante Crisis
Econ6mica Mundial [They Will Seek a Bill for Tax Reform Before Global Economic Crisis], ASAMBLEA NACIONAL REPUBLICA DELi- EcUADOR COMISION DE
LEGIS LACION Y Dr, FISCALIZACION, Nov.21, 2008, http://comision.asambleana-

cional.gov.eclindex.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=16526&ltemid=1.
266. Ministro de Justicia, Secretaria del Migrantey Subsecretarios De Gobierno y de
CancilleriaDefienden Proyecto Urgente [Ministerof Justice, Secretary of Migration,
Secretaries of Government, and Foreign Ministry Defend Urgent Project], ASAMB3uA NACIONAL REPUBLICA DE ECUADOR, Feb. 24, 2010, http://www.asamble-

anacional.gov.ec201002242564/noticias/boletines/minsitro-de-justicia-secretariadel-migrante-y-subsecretarios-de-gobierno-y-de-cancilleria-defienden-proyectourgente.html.
267. See Asamblea Inici6 Debate de Reforma Que Revaloriza Pensiones de Jubilacion
[The Reform Assembly Began a Debate That Reassesses Retirement Pensions],
EcUADoaENVivo, Aug. 5, 2010, http://www.ecuadorenvivo.com/2010080555592/

politica/asambleainicio-debate-dereforma-que-revalorizapensionesde jubilacion.htmi.
268. Hugh Bronstein, Ecuador's Rafael Correa Gets Grip on Congress After Riots, PosCIRONICLE,

Oct.

8,

2010,

http://www.postchronicle.com/cgi-bin/artman/exec/

view.cgi?archive=228&num=3 2 647 8 .
269. Ecuador Politics: Setbacks for Correa, EcoNoMisT INTE-LLIGENCE UNIT, Sept. 2,
2010, http://www.eiu.com/index.asp?layout=VWArticleVW3&article-id=474025
89&region-id=&country-id=1790000179&refm=vwCtry&page title=Latest+analysis&rf=0. Alianza Pais currently holds 53 of the National Assembly's 124 seats.
Id.
270. Id.
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islation through normal channels, Correa has begun to use proyectos
urgentes as a means to bypass the deadlocked Legislature and push
through legislation without opposition approval. 271 For instance, in April
2009, Correa sent a proyecto urgente that required each employer to give
8.33% of an employee's salary to the Social Security Fund. 2 7 2 Correa
used political gamesmanship and sent the proyecto urgente on April 6,
knowing that the National Assembly was going to be in recess from April
13 to April 27 due to national elections on April 26.273 As a result of this
timing, the National Assembly's thirty-day review period was essentially
cut in half, as the thirty-day time period is not tolled during national elections or congressional recess. 2 7 4 Notwithstanding the drama that surrounded the timing of Correa's proyecto urgente, the National Assembly
approved it.
Moreover, on June 25, 2010, Correa sent the National Assembly a
275
The law
proyecto urgente modifying the nation's Hydrocarbons Law.
expropriaface
or
contracts
requires foreign corporations to sign service
tion. 2 7 6 Such service contracts require the state to pay the companies to
pump oil, with the state owning all oil pumped within Ecuadorian territory. 27 7 Recognizing that neither the AP nor the opposition had enough
votes to modify, approve, or deny the proyecto, Correa and his allies
merely delayed any discussion of the proyecto for the thirty-day timeperiod. 27 8 As a result, Correa's proyecto urgente became law without any
legislative debate including the opposition. 279
Due to Correa's inability to pass key pieces of legislation through normal channels, there is some concern that Correa will dissolve the Na280
It
tional Assembly and rule by decree until national elections are held.
is unclear, however, whether the recent coup attempt has emboldened
Correa to do so, or if he will seek to work with his opposition to build a
271.

272.

273.
274.
275.
276.

See generally Ecuador Industry: Taking Control of Oil, EcoNoMIsT INTEL IGENCE

UNIr, July 27, 2010, http://www.eiu.com/index.asp?layout=VWArticleVW3&articleid=497302834&region-id=&countryid=1 790000179&refm=vwCtry&page-titie= Latest+analysis&fs=true.
Report on the Legislative and Oversight Commission Ecuador, CARFTER CiENTER 21,
8 (April 2009), http://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/CLF%20Report% 0
April%202009.pdf [hereinafter Report on the Legislative and Oversight Commission Ecuador].
Id. at 4. 1 define "political gamesmanship" to be the use of tactical methods to
increase one's chances of succeeding in their desired objective. While political
gamesmanship does not involve illegal tactics, it often involves unethical tactics.
See Report on the Legislative and Oversight Commission Ecuador,supra note 272.
Ecuador Industry: Taking Control of Oil, supra note 271.
Id.; Mercedes Alvaro, Ecuador's Correa to Enact Hydrocarbons Reforms on Mon24
day, FoxBUSINESS, July 24, 2010, http://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/2010/07/ /
Risky
Industry:
ecuadors-correa-enact-hydrocarbons-reforms-monday/; Ecuador
Hydrocarbons Reform, ECONOMIsT INTELLIGENCE UNIT, Sept. 2, 2010, http://

277.
278.
279.
280.

www.eiu.com/index.asp?layout=VWArticleVW3&article-id=19'7402604&regionid=&country-id=1790000179&refm=vwCtry&pagejtitle=Latest+analysis&fs= true.
Ecuador Industry: Risky Hydrocarbons Reform, supra note 276.
Ecuador Politics: Setbacks for Correa, supra note 269; Alvaro, supra note 276.
Ecuador Politics: Setbacks for Correa, supra note 269.
Ecuador Politics: Crisis Overcome, Risks Linger, supra note 259.
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consensus of pieces of legislation. 281
Overall, during the Correa era we see a decrease in the use of postapproval DDA. Nonetheless, there appears to have been a recent uptick
in Correa's DDA use due to his inability to pass legislation through normal channels. As such, Correa and his allies in the National Assembly
have been able to push through proyectos urgentes without permitting
open legislative discussion. Thus, while DDA may not have been Correa's first method of choice in seeking legislative change, it appears that
he is more willing to issue proyectos urgentes in an attempt to bypass his
opposition and push through legislation.
3.

Comparing The Two Eras

Because the use of post-approval DDA is different from that of preapproval DDA, the qualitative factors for measuring post-approval DDA
are different. Under this analysis we will look at the number of proyectos
urgentes sent to the National Assembly. To ensure that the number of
proyectos urgentes is not skewed by the length of a presidency, this number will be compared to the time length of each presidency. The analysis
additionally looks at the number of times the National Assembly has rejected a proyecto urgente.282 Finally, the analysis includes a subjective
element to determine whether any of the proyectos urgentes were controversial in nature or whether they substantially altered pre-existing legal,
political, or economic rights of the nation's citizens. Figure 4 below provides a visual comparison on the use of post-approval DDA during the
previously discussed eras.
Figure 4: Ecuadoran DDA
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Number of Proyectos Urgentes: Comparing the two eras, there does
not appear to be much of a difference between Correa and his predecessors regarding the total number of proyectos urgentes sent to the Legislature. Whereas Correa's predecessors each sent twelve, ten, and eight
281. See Lindsay Green-Barber, From Ecuador. What Correa's "Coup" Means For Democracy, AMERICAS Q., Oct. 7, 2010, http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/1862.
282. While it would have been useful to determine how much the National Assembly
has modified the particular proyectos urgentes, such information is not available.
283. Note that these figures are accurate as of October 15, 2010.
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proyectos urgentes, respectively, Correa has sent ten proyectos urgentes to
the National Assembly.
Frequency of Proyectos Urgentes: While the numbers of proyectos
urgentes sent to the National Assembly appear relatively similar, the frequency of proyectos urgentes has decreased significantly under Correa.
For instance, on average Noboa sent one proyecto urgente every three
months, Gutierrez sent a proyecto urgente every 2.7 months, and Palacio
sent one proyecto urgente every 1.9 months. Although the frequency of
proyectos urgentes increased over time, no Executive tried to inundate
the Legislature with a continuous stream of them.
The trend of increased frequency of proyectos urgentes has been dramatically reversed under the Correa era. During Correa's presidency, he
has sent, on average, one proyecto urgente every 4.6 months. 284 It is important to note, however, that Correa's figure of sending ten proyectos
urgentes during his now three-year presidency may be skewed due to the
country's Constituent Assembly and subsequent six-month dissolution of
the National Assembly in 2007.285 While the National Assembly was dissolved, Correa could not send proyectos urgentes to the legislature since
no Assembly existed to receive them. It is important to note, however,
that the frequency of Correa's post-approval DDA may be increasing as
Correa has recently begun to send proyectos urgentes to the National Assembly much more frequently.
Number of Proyectos Urgentes Rejected: The evidence also shows that
Ecuador's National Assembly has only rejected three proyectos urgentes
since January 2000. In fact, the National Assembly has not rejected any
proyectos urgentes since the Palacio presidency, which began in April
2005. This trend can be due to several possibilities. One is that the Executives have become wiser in sending certain pieces of legislation through
proyectos urgentes. That is, when a proyecto urgente contains complex
issues, the Executives may believe that it is more appropriate to send the
proposed legislation through ordinary means instead of through DDA.
Another possibility is that the National Assembly has become more adept at modifying the Executives' proyectos urgentes and no longer needs
to completely reject a proyecto urgente. Finally, the Executives may simply enjoy majority support within the Legislature, thereby making rejection unlikely.
Number of Controversial Proyectos Urgentes: Substantively, only one
proyecto urgente during both eras can be considered controversial-Correa's proyecto modifying the Hydrocarbons Law. Even though the
proyecto gives Ecuador control over all of its native resources, it does
provide for the potential nationalization of the oil industry. Thus, it is
284. Even if the number reflected the six-month dissolution of the National Assembly,
the frequency would be one proyecto for every four months.
285. Ecuador Forum Dissolves Congress, BBC NLws, Nov. 30, 2007, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilamericas/7119373.stm.
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necessary to see what future effect this proyecto will have on private companies in Ecuador's oil industry.
Moreover, we see that Correa has used post-approval DDA powers
three times in a manner that must be considered controversial. Unlike
his predecessors, Correa has used political gamesmanship when sending a
proyecto urgente to give the National Assembly a shorter time-frame to
react. Moreover, we see that Correa extended the scope of his post-approval DDA by modifying the criminal code through his proyecto urgente
combating the illegal sale of oil. Finally, Correa has taken advantage of
the National Assembly's legislative deadlock to push through proyectos
urgentes. Since Correa's allies are the largest political block in the Assembly, Correa has been able to use proyectos urgentes and the opposition's inability to override the AP to prevent his political opposition from
having a political discussion over the proyectos.
IS DDA CURRENTLY THREATENING THE RULE OF LAW
IN VENEZUELA AND ECUADOR?
As previously discussed, both pre-approval and post-approval DDA
pose threats to the rule of law. The following analysis seeks to determine
whether Chivez and Correa's use of DDA has threatened the rule of law
in their countries. Because two of these leaders-Chivez and Correahave several years remaining in their current presidential terms, it is necessary to determine whether their use of DDA currently poses a threat to
the rule of law. If ChAvez or Correa's use of DDA currently poses a
threat to the rule of law, any future DDA use by the two leaders will
further threaten the rule of law.
VI.

A.

VENEZUELA

It is clear that ChAvez has threatened, and continues to threaten, the
rule of law through his use of pre-approval DDA. As the scope of ChAvez' DDA powers have increased, so has DDA's threat to the rule of law
in Venezuela. Since 1999, ChAvez' scope of DDA powers have extended
from economic and financial matters to twelve different areas under the
2007 enabling law. Based on the broad scope of DDA powers, ChAvez
has used his DDA powers to enact laws in every area of Venezuelan
society.
Furthermore, DDA has allowed ChAvez to become the nation's leading
legislator. During the 2007 enabling law, ChAvez issued sixty-seven decrees into law, totaling seventy-three percent of all laws passed. 286 Essentially, Chivez, through the enabling law, has consolidated both Executive
and Legislative powers within the Executive branch.
Accordingly, ChAvez' use of DDA threatens the rule of law as it fails to
satisfy the requirement of "formal equality" in several regards. First,
Chdvez' initial grant of the DDA powers under an enabling law no longer
286. Democracy and Human Rights in Venezuela, supra note 131,

327.
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satisfies formal equality. In fact, ChAvez has undermined Legislature's
control over the enabling law, thereby disrupting the Executive-Legislative interplay that is key to DDA. As such, ChAvez has negated the Legislature's, let alone the opposition's, voice regarding the content of the
enabling laws. Consequently, the initial grant of pre-approval DDA powers does not follow "carefully dictated procedures" as the Legislature is
nominally involved in determining the scope of ChAvez' DDA powers. 2 8 7
Moreover, ChAvez' promulgation of decrees under the enabling law
fails to satisfy the formal equality requirement as ChAvez does not involve the Legislature regarding the content of the decrees. For example,
Chivez issued twenty-six decrees on the last day of this 2007 DDA
grant.2 8 8 ChAvez, however, did not release the actual text of the decrees
until a week later.289 Thus, ChAvez changed Venezuela's status quo without any legislative involvement and without providing the text of the decrees at the time they were promulgated. Accordingly, ChAvez explicitly
excluded Venezuela's Legislature, and his political opposition, from any
discussion regarding the content of these decrees. As such, ChAvez' use
of DDA did not follow the "carefully dictated procedures" that are required in the lawmaking process.
Furthermore, ChAvez' DDA powers fail to satisfy the "formal equality"
requirement by changing Venezuela's criminal code through decrees.
When a law or decree substantially changes the rights and obligations of a
nation's citizens, it is imperative that carefully dictated procedures be followed to ensure that the decrees were not made with invidious motives.
Here, no such procedures were followed. Instead, ChAvez altered the nation's criminal code without providing any public dialogue. Since no public dialogue occurred, ChAvez effectively denied any individuals whose
rights would be affected by the new criminal standards a chance to challenge the laws before they were promulgated. Even though these individuals may challenge these decrees in court, the decrees enjoy the force of
law until they are found to be unconstitutional. Because it often takes
months, if not years, before a law is struck down by Venezuela's Supreme
Court, ChAvez will have a substantial amount of time to confiscate goods
and send individuals to prison under these decrees. Thus, although these
individuals may be able to repeal the decrees in the future, there is nothing they can do in the short-term to protect themselves from any invidious actions taken by ChAvez.
Chdvez' DDA use has additionally nullified horizontal accountability
by making the content of his decrees virtually untouchable. Even though
the 2000 and 2007 enabling laws had commissions monitoring ChAvez'
DDA use, those commissions were filled with ChAvez' cronies who readily acquiesced to ChAvez' denands. 2 9 0 Additionally, as Chivez has ac287.
288.
289.
290.

See Section V.A.2.a, supra.
See Romero, supra note 184
Id.
See BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 174, at 73.
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quired more power over the grant of the enabling law, ChAvez has
positioned himself to be the only individual who can challenge his DDA
powers. Thus, because Chivez sculpted the enabling laws with decreased
involvement by the Legislature, he has become the ultimate authority as
to the Legislature's intent over whether he is acting outside the boundaries established under any enabling law. As such, Chivez' political opposition, or the Legislature itself, has little recourse to reprimand ChAvez
for acting outside of those boundaries.
Overall, the use of DDA during the Chivez era has progressively become a larger threat to the rule of law in Venezuela. Considering Chivez
has several years left under his current term and is not limited by any
term limits, it seems evident that Chivez will continue to obtain longer
and broader grants of DDA. If Chdvez succeeds in obtaining broader
and longer grants of the enabling law, DDA's threat to the rule of law will
continue to increase until the rule of law no longer exists in Venezuela.
B.

ECUADOR

Correa's use of post-approval DDA in Ecuador presents a growing
threat to the rule of law. Although Correa, overall, has used his DDA
powers less frequently than his predecessors, he has recently shown a
penchant of using proyectos urgentes in a controversial manner. Nonetheless, Correa's threat to the rule of law is limited by Ecuador's 2008
Constitution.
Ecuadoran DDA's threat is limited due to the 2008 Constitution's limit
of one proyecto urgente at a time and the thirty-day time-period the National Assembly has to respond. 2 91 Because of these procedural safeguards, laws based on proyectos urgentes follow the requirement of
"formal equality" since they are enacted under carefully dictated procedures. "Formal equality" is also generally satisfied as opposition groups
can voice their opinions about the content of the proyectos urgentes
before they are decreed into law.
While the 2008 Constitution provides procedural safeguards to guarantee formal equality, Correa and his allies in the National Assembly have
been able to take advantage of the Assembly's legislative deadlock to
push through proyectos without much opposition involvement. In fact,
little, if any, opposition involvement occurred when Correa sent the controversial Hydrocarbon proyecto to the National Assembly. Moreover,
Correa's use of political gamesmanship by sending proyectos urgentes to
the Legislature, knowing that it would be in recess for half of the constitutionally guaranteed thirty day time period, is problematic. By cutting
the time period for Legislative involvement in half, Correa effectively
limits some of the "carefully dictated procedures" that ensure opposition
participation in the legislative process.
291.

See RiPuBUc OF EcUADOR CONSTITUION oi, 2008 art. 140.
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Furthermore, it is questionable whether horizontal accountability continues to exist within Ecuador under the Correa era based on the National Assembly's legislative deadlock. Since neither Correa's allies nor
his opposition currently maintain enough votes to challenge Correa's
proyectos urgentes, it remains unclear whether the National Assembly
would reject one of Correa's proyectos for being outside the scope of his
authority. Accordingly, it appears that the Executive-Legislative interplay that is at the core of DDA currently is lacking in Ecuador considering the small likelihood of legislative action checking Correa's Executive
decrees.
An additional concern is that Correa, unlike his predecessors, has used
a proyecto urgente to change the nation's criminal code. This issue is not
as problematic as it would be under pre-approval DDA since Ecuador's
Legislature still maintains the chance to discuss and approve, modify, or
reject the changes. Nonetheless, the use of proyectos urgentes to change
the criminal code is problematic in that Correa has actively tried to
broaden the scope of his DDA powers to include non-economic matters.
Moreover, Correa's attempt to change the criminal code through
proyectos urgentes creates a dangerous precedent, whereby Correa and
future presidents will be able to use proyectos urgentes to modify the nation's criminal code.
Overall, Correa's use of DDA has posed a nominal threat to the rule of
law within Ecuador, which is largely due to the constitutional protections
provided for in Ecuador's 1998 and 2008 Constitutions. Correa, however,
has shown a trend towards using DDA is a manner that undermines the
Executive-Legislative interplay and limits his opposition's ability to voice
their opinion over the proyecto urgente's content. Accordingly, it will be
necessary to see how Correa uses proyectos urgentes in the future to determine whether Correa's use of post-approval DDA becomes an increased threat to the rule of law.
C.

COMPARISON OF THE COUNTRIES

Of the countries studied in this article, only Venezuela's DDA under
Chivez presents a legitimate threat to the rule of law. ChAvez' use of
DDA through the enabling law has threatened the rule of law in Venezuela by denying formal equality and horizontal accountability. Moreover, ChAvez' use of DDA has substantially consolidated lawmaking power
within the Executive branch. Unless Venezuela rewrites its constitution
to limit the Executive's pre-approval DDA powers, future Venezuelan
Executives will continue to obtain longer and broader DDA powers,
which, in turn, will continue to threaten the rule of law in Venezuela.
At the same time ChAvez has increased his DDA powers, Correa in
Ecuador has restrained his DDA use. Although Correa has recently
shown some tendencies towards using Ecuador's post-approval DDA in a
way that could threaten the rule of law, Correa's DDA use does not present nearly as larger of a threat to the rule of law due to the limited use of
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proyectos urgentes. Furthermore, we see that because of the constitutional limits that are inherent in post-approval DDA, the potential for
abuse is must less than that is seen in pre-approval DDA. However, if
Correa continues to use political gamesmanship to limit his opposition's
opportunities to voice their opinion regarding any proyecto urgente,
DDA's threat to the rule of law could increase. Nonetheless, at this moment, Correa's use of DDA is not comparable to that of Chivez, and it is
not appropriate to categorize Correa with Chivez regarding their DDA
use.
Overall, it appears that Chivez is a unique instance where a leader has
used DDA to consolidate lawmaking power within the Executive branch
and threaten the rule of law. ChAvez, however, provides the framework
for future leaders on how to obtain broader DDA powers. Moreover,
ChAvez' DDA use also provides precedential support for Venezuela's future leaders.
Based on the above analysis, there appears to be some causality between different forms of DDA and their threat to the rule of law. For
instance, we see that when an Executive possesses an immense amount of
political power, that Executive can use pre-approval DDA in a manner
that undermines the rule of law-i.e., ChAvez. At the same time, however, we see that not every popular leader uses pre-approval DDA in a
way that threatens the rule of law-i.e., Correa. Moreover, even though
post-approval DDA does not generally present as large of a threat to the
rule of law due to constitutional limits that are in place, a leader-i.e.,
Correa-may use his DDA powers in such a way as to manipulate the
legislative system and present a threat to the rule of law. Thus, it is important to recognize that each unique form of DDA offers its own unique
threat to the rule of law. As such, I recommend that future studies further explore the relationship between different forms of DDA and their
threat to the rule of law so as to better understand what DDA characteristics, in practice, threaten the rule of law.
D.

PRESCRIPTIVE SAFEGUARDS ON DDA TO PROTECT THE RULE
OF LAW

Even though it remains unanswered as to what specific DDA characteristics present the greatest threat the to the rule of law, I believe that
every South American country offering DDA should have several safeguards in place so as to limit DDA's threat to the rule of law. In regards
to pre-approval DDA, the constitution must limit the scope of DDA powers to specific areas. Although the DDA powers need not be limited to
solely economic or financial matters, it is important that the powers not
extend to criminal or individual rights, which can be used by an Executive
to attack the political opposition. Moreover, the constitution should contain temporal limits on the length of the DDA grant. A nation's Legislature should function as the country's lawmaking body and limit any
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particular grant of DDA to six or less months to ensure that lawmaking
authority is not being completely usurped by the Executive.
Furthermore, when drafting a grant of pre-approval DDA, a nation's
Legislature must remain active in the drafting process. The Legislature
must provide specific details as to the substantive scope of the Executive's decrees. Such guidelines need not provide a checklist of everything
that must be included within any one decree. These guidelines, however,
should provide enough detail to indicate that the Legislature thought
through its DDA grant and intended to limit the Executive's DDA powers to specific areas and criteria. Moreover, pre-approval DDA should
also provide for a monitoring system to ensure that the Executive-Legislative interplay is healthy and active. Although the Executive may
choose to ignore the opposition, the monitoring system is symbolically
important in that it provides the political opposition a voice, albeit a small
one, in the legislative process.
In post-approval DDA, a nation's constitution should contain several
safeguards to provide the Legislature adequate opportunity to respond to
any Executive decree and to prevent the Executive from inundating the
Legislature with decrees. Accordingly, the constitution should provide a
Legislature the absolute authority to modify, amend, or deny any postapproval decree. Furthermore, the Legislature must be given adequate
time-i.e., a minimum of thirty days-to respond to any such decree. Finally, the constitution should limit the Executive to one post-approval
decree at a time, so that the Legislature is not forced to address numerous post-approval decrees at any given moment.
While these safeguards are not perfect, they do help limit DDA's threat
to the rule of law. These safeguards help ensure that "formal equality"
exists by providing weaker political figures a voice, albeit a small one, in
the drafting and enforcement of pre-approval DDA grants. Moreover,
they allow minority voices the opportunity to openly discuss post-approval DDA decrees through legislative dialogue. These safeguards also
help provide "horizontal accountability" in that the Legislature can annul
any decrees that are outside of the Executive's DDA powers, thereby
ensuring that the lawmaking authority remains within the Legislature and
not the Executive.
VII.

CONCLUSION

DDA is prevalent throughout South America and is used by leaders of
all political ideologies. Although both pre-approval and post-approval
DDA pose their own unique threats to the rule of law, the threat can be
limited through careful constitutional drafting and legislative oversight.
Constitutional text can limit the scope and time-length of pre-approval
DDA and the amount of post-approval decrees an Executive can send at
any one time. Moreover, a country's Legislature can monitor an Executive's DDA use to ensure that the Executive does not consolidate lawmaking power within the Executive branch.
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Of the countries and leaders studied under this article, only Hugo Chivez in Venezuela poses a legitimate threat to the rule of law through his
DDA use. On the other hand, Rafael Correa in Ecuador poses a smaller,
but increasing, threat to the rule of law. Although Correa has recently
shown some tendencies to use DDA in a manner that potentially threatens the rule of law, Correa has not used DDA enough to present a real
threat to the rule of law. It is important, however, that we continue to
monitor DDA use in these countries to ensure that Chivez and Correa do
not continue to consolidate Legislative powers within the Executive
branch to further threaten the rule of law, and to prevent future Executives from using their DDA powers in ways that may increase DDA's
threat to the rule of law.

